Isolation and Aggregation in Economics by Schlicht, Ekkehart


Ekkehart Schlicht 
Isolation and Aggregation 
in Economics 
Springer-Verlag 
Berlin Heidelberg NewYork Tokyo 
Prof. Dr. Ekkehart Schlicht 
Institut flir Volkswirtschaftslehre, 
Technische Hochschule Darmstadt, SchloD 
D-6100 Darmstadt 
(c) Ekkehart Schlicht. All rights reserved. This work may be 
freely distributed for non-commercial use. 
The original hard cover copy is available for €/$ 50.- here, 
ISBN 3-540- 15254-7 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg New York Tokyo 
ISBN 0-387- 15254-7 Springer-Verhg New York Heidelberg Berlin Tokyo 
LI- of Cwgress Catnloging-in-Pubkation DPta 
Schlicht, Ekkehart, Isolation and aggregation in economics. Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 
I .  Macroeconomics. I. litle. 
HB172.5.S35 1985 339 85-12638 
ISBN 0-387-15254-7 (US.) 
'This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the 
material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, re-use of illustrations, broad- 
casting, reproduction by photocopying machine or similar means, and storage in data banks. 
Under 5 54 of the German Copyright Law where copies are made for other than private use a 
fee is payable to "VerwertungsgeseUschatl Wort", Munich. 
0 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1985 
Printed in Germany 
The use of general descriptive names, trade marks, etc. in this publication, even if the former 
are not especially identified, is not to be taken as a sign that such names, as understood by the 
Trade Marks and Merchandise Marks Act. may accordingly by used h d y  by anyone. 
Typesetting, Printing and Bookbinding: Konrad Triltrch, Graphischer Betrieb, Wonburg 
2142/3140-543210 
For my family 

Preface 
In order to solve a given problem, economic analysis is com- 
pelled to concentrate on the interaction of selected factors 
while disregarding a multitude of other influences. This book 
offers a discussion of certain central premises involved here 
and draws some analytical consequences. The argument is fo- 
cused on process analysis, i.e., on the analysis of economic 
processes within a given institutional setting, although certain 
corollaries for institutional analysis are patent. 
Many colleagues and students have helped me, for many 
years, to develop the views presented here, and it seems im- 
possible to trace individual influences. Thus I can only ex- 
press my indebtedness in a macro sense. 
I wish to thank the Westdeutscher Verlag for its kind per- 
mission to use material from my Grundlagen der okonomi- 
schen Analyse. The results of Chap. 4 were presented at the 
Econometric Society European Meeting in Pisa, 1983. Dr. W. 
A. Miiller from Springer-Verlag has encouraged me to write 
this book and has been helpful in many ways. 
Darmstadt, March 1985 Ekkehart Schlicht 
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1. The Setting of the Argument 
The laws of economics are to be wmpared to 
the law of the tides, rather than with the 
simple and exact law of gravitation. 
Alfred Marshall 
1.1 Two Characteristics of Economic Analysis 
Economic phenomena are the outcomes of a plethora of factors, and 
economic analysis, unable to tackle them all, is compelled to select those 
factors which seem to be the most important, and to consider all other 
influences as data of the analysis. But these data are only provisional 
since they are wandering themselves. One characteristic of economic 
analysis is, then, that it is built on a moving foundation. 
Furthermore, economics is not concerned with the idiosyncrasies of 
particular cases, but looks for general rules linking typical incidents. 
Usually these rules cannot be distilled stringently from the multitude of 
individual actions, and economics is bound, hence, to start from as- 
sumptions on the behaviour of aggregates - or "representative" agents - 
which are linked to individual actions just vaguely. This way of 
proceeding is most apparent, and most important, in the case of 
macroeconon&, where we assume aggregate behaviour from the outset, 
but it is also of ;elevance for microeconomics. 
The following discussion sets out to probe into these problems: the 
provisional nature of economic data and the nature of aggregative 
assumptions. Since we are going to tackle these problems by isolation 
and aggregation, these considerations set the themes for the book. 
1.2 The Provisional Nature of Economic Data 
1.2.1 Data and Variables 
We explain economic phenomena by relating them to their causes. Price 
formation in a particular market is, for instance, explained by the inter- 
action of supply and demand. The conditions of supply and demand are 
the data of this problem which are presupposed in the explanation of 
the variable, which is the price in our example. 'Quite generally those 
conditions which are presupposed in the analysis are the data, and those 
phenomena we seek to explain are the variables of the problem '. 
2.2 Provisional Data 
An economic datum is not, however, absolutely fixed like a natural 
constant. Rather it is to be viewed as being determined by other causes: 
The supply behaviour of firms is influenced by their strategies and the 
technologcal conditions under which they operate, and the demand of 
households is influenced by their incomes and preferences. 
Again, these are not ultimate data since preferences, strategies and 
technologies are subject to various influences and might change over 
time. Hence economic data are typically only of a provisional nature. 
This holds true quite generally since economic processes are built on 
psychologml factors and are embedded in and interact with sociological 
processes. Hence psychological and sociological circumstances are to be 
considered as data, and we know that these change over time: They 
have a dynamic of their own and are themselves influenced by the 
economic processes. 
But even if we aim to incorporate all relevant psychological and 
sociological processes within the analysis, we cannot hope to gain a firm 
stand. We will be unable to predict the development of all those in- 
fluences subject to technical change, since we cannot predict still 
unknown future inventions with accuracy 2. Hence those data describing 
technology are provisional by necessity, and the provisional nature of 
economic data cannot be avoided in this respect, at least. Since techno- 
logical change is of paramount importance in economics, we have to 
face thls difficulty, and we have to face it in practice also with respe'ct to 
sociologxal and psychological data since there is no hope, at present, for 
a useful all-embracing theory of social processes. 
The provisional nature of our data leads to a particular problem: 
What is to be considered as variable, and what is to be considered as 
I Variables can be quantities, but also qualities: Private property can be viewed as one 
particular form of ownership, and we can try to explain why this form has come to be. 
Here the form of ownership is the variable of the problem. 
2 At best we can make some broad guesses about future developments: Vague 
aggregative predictions might be possible here, but no detailed predictions excluding 
changes and deviations. 
fixed if everything is floating? What are the requirements which are to 
be met by those factors which we take as data of our analysis? Let us 
consider this question. 
1.2.3 The Ceteris Paribus Clause 
Economic data are not ultimate data, like the speed of light in physics. 
Rather they are provisional in nature. This is expressed by means of the 
ceteris paribus clause. All factors not explicitly considered as variables 
are assumed to be fixed within an argument. This clause is used, 
explicitly or implicitly, throughout economics. 
The ceteris paribus clause is particularly restrictive in those cases 
where only a narrowly limited issue is analysed, such as price formation 
in a single market. Effects on other markets, and possible repercussions, 
are excluded. Price changes in one market might lead to price changes 
in other markets, however, and these work back on the market under 
consideration The assumption that all other prices are given is certainly 
wrong here. But the same reservation applies also to more comprehensive 
theories, since these have to presuppose data, too, and repercussions of 
the processes under study on the, data of the analysis cannot be 
excluded, irrespective of how we try to delimit the problem ! Economics 
is bound to perform partial analysis rather than total analysis: It 
considers phenomena in an economic system which is only a part of the 
wider complex and interdependent social system, and fixes its demarca- 
tions by means of the ceteris paribus clause. 
1.2.4 A' Difficulty in Applications 
An economic theory can offer only an analysis of a partial issue and 
proceeds from provisional data which are generated by means of the 
ceteris paribus clause. These provisional data will change over time, 
however, contrary to what was postulated. This leads to a particular 
dificulty in applications: Wrong predictions can always be attributed to 
changes in boundary conditions while maintaining that the theory 
would. have given a correct prediction if the ceteris paribus clause had 
not been violated. 
3 Walras seems to have overlooked this point He has argued against the study of 
isolated markets with the above argument, but failed to see that this argument can be 
turned against general equilibrium theory as well (see Walras, appendix 11). 
If it is predicted, for instance, that certain policy measures will boost 
the economy, and the expected economic recovery does not actually 
occur, it is always possible to name certain "special and unforeseeable" 
developments which can be made responsible for the failure of the 
policy measure without invalidating the theory. 
Even if a prediction turns out to be correct it can always be argued 
that the predicted phenomenon has occurred for other reasons than 
those given in theory. Jevons (p. 88) gives the following example. 
Entirely to prove the good effects of Free Trade in England, for example, we ought to have 
the nation unaltered in every circumstance except the abolition of burdens and restrictions 
on trade. But it is obvious that while Free Trade was being introduced into England, many 
other causes of prosperity were also coming into action - the progress of invention, the 
construction of railways, the profuse consumption of coal, the extension of colonies, etc., 
etc. Although, then, the beneficial results of Free Trade are great and unquestionable, they 
could hardly be proved a posteriori 4. 
The complexity and diversity of the factors fixed under the ceteris 
paribus clause leads, hence, to our inability to control them. We are not 
even able to name them in detail; to describe any state of the world 
completely seems to go beyond our powers. 
1.2.5 Economics as a Deductive Science 
~ e v o n s  draws the following conklusion from his example. 
Although, then, the beneficent results of Free Trade are great and unquestionable, they 
could hardly be proved to exist aposteriori: they are to be believed because deductive rea- 
soning from almost certain truth leads us contidently to expect such results, and there is 
nothing in experience which in the least conflicts with our expectations (Jevons, p. 88). 
4 This problem is a matter of principle even if we are able, nowadays, to set up an 
econometric model separating these effects. This is the well-known identification 
problem in econometrics which arises always because there exists in all cases an 
infinite number of theoretical models compatible with a given set of o b ~ e ~ a t i o m .  In 
order to solve this identification problem, we have to restrict the class of admissible 
models on a priori grounds (by using the principle of parsimony, for instance) and to 
develop a priori criteria for the goodness of fit such that the observationo select one 
and only one of the admissible models By the way Jevons seems to presuppose in the 
above example that the various influences mentioned combine additively. In the words 
of John Stuart Mill (p. 59) economic forces are viewed as combining mechanically 
rather than chemically here, i.e. they are not assumed to produce qualitatively novel 
phenomena by their iateraction. As pointed out by Marshall (p. 637). howper, this 
might be misleading. 
If economics is viewed in this spirit as a deductive science drawing 
logical implications from certain premises, it cannot lead to false con- 
clusions, but this shifts the problem to the assumptions we start with: 
How can we convince ourselves that these assumptions are reasonably 
realistic, if this cannot be done with reference to their implications, as 
Jevons has argued, and if we know that the data we start with are of 
provisional nature only?' Critical introspection might give some hints as 
to rules of human conduct, no doubt, but it will highlight, too, the 
volatile nature of our motives and our conduct, and the various in- 
fluences interfering here. To gain a firm starting point (if there is any) 
would require to go into psychology 6. 
.2.6 The Homo Oeconomicus 
One way out is to confine economics to the economic aspect of 
behaviour. This is the view of Carl Menger. According to this view, 
economics is concerned with the course of events under the hypothetical 
assumption that man acts as a "homo oeconomicus", guided solely by 
economic motives - the striving for the maximization of utility and 
profit. The existence of other motives is not denied, neither is it 
excluded that their effects might ovemde the economic factors, but their 
workings are not seen as a theme which exact economics has to 
consider, this theme is relegated to the other social sciences7. The 
relevance of 9 g i e w  is defended by asserting that economic motives 
I , .  
5 I do not amsider Friedman's view here that it does not matter whether the assump- 
tions made are realistic or not as long the predictions are correct - I am not interested in 
theories leading to right predictions for the wrong reasons (cf. Friedman). 
6 Some eamomists think that we are entitled to postulate stable time-invariant 
preference of individuals, if these preferences are suitably formulated; this artifice 
might avoid psychology to a large extent (see StigledBecker). The idea is that 
commodities are thought of as producing satisfaction not directly but indirectly 
through a household technology which transforms these commodities into variables 
entering the utility function Learning effects can be described by this approach, for 
instance, if the consumption of music produces "music appreciation" by increasing the 
faculty f a  music appreciation simultaneously with its consumption. In this way all 
instabilities can be attributed to changes in household technology rather than to 
changing preferences. Although this view is sometimes'very ilIuminating, it shifts the 
psychological problem to household technology and replaces the phrase "tastes 
remaining the same" by "household technology remaining the same", i.e. it cannot do 
away with the ceteris paribus clause. 
7 Menger p 59. Menger distinguishes between "exact" or "theoretical" and "realistic 
empirical" economics. The latter is only able to establish historical regularities without 
proving their necessity. 
are dominant in propelling the economic -process, and it is hence im- 
portant to study their workings in isolation8. This claim for relevance 
can only be maintained, however, if we can explain why it is admissible 
to fix all "non-economic" factors under a ceteris paribus clause even if 
they are only of minor importance, and still obtain meaningful results. 
1.2.7 The Isolation Principle 
If an economic theory is intended to elucidate real issues, we have to use 
ceteris paribus clauses which are sufficiently realistic. This condition will 
never be exactly fulfilled. Hence we cannot hope to devise exact 
theories. Nevertheless our theories can give an appropriate picture of 
the process under study if the data of our analysis are reasonably stable 
in comparison to the speed of that process. 
We are entitled, for instance, to explain the level of a certain price by 
the intersection of supply and demand schedules at each instant of time 
if price adjustment is very fast and the changes in the configuration of 
supply and demand are very sluggish. Here the ceteris paribus clause 
"suppIy and demand conditions remaining the same" will lead to an 
equilibrium price which approximates, at any instant, the true price 
sufficiently well. This approximation will not be possible, however, if 
price adjustment is slow and supply and demand conditions are 
changing rapidly. The ceteris paribus clause "supply and demand 
conditions remaining the same" will not be admissible in that case. 
More generally it is to be required that those factors fixed under a 
ceteris paribus clause be sufficiently stable with regard to the process 
under study9. This is the isolation principle. Chapter 2 ("On Isolation") is 
3 devoted to its elaboration. 
1.2.8 The Moving Equilibrium Method 
A basic premise of economic analysis is that a result derived under a 
ceteris paribus clause will remain approximately valid even if the factors 
fixed under that clause are actually changing slightly. This premise is, 
however, not always true, but rather only under certain conditions, 
which our theories must meet. 
8 Meager p. 79. 
9 Stable in the sense of sufficiently invariant over time. 
Chapter 3 ("The Moving Equilibrium Method") is devoted to a dis- 
cussion of this proposition in the context of equilibrium analysis: 
Moving data lead to moving equilibria - hence the name of themethod - 
and the question is whether actual movements can be approximated 
sufficiently well by moving equilibria. 
1.2.9 The Nature of Economic Theories 
Since economics has to build upon provisional data which are generated 
by the cekris paribus clause and satisfy the isolation principle, it can 
only hope to explain phenomena by factors which are changing 
themselves, but changing more slowly. Keynes put it as follows. 
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models 
which are relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike 
the typical natural science, the material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not 
homogeneom through time. The object of a model is to segregate the semi-permanent or 
relatively coostant factors from those which are transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a 
logical way of thinking about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which 
they give rise in particular cases. l o  
1.2.10 Consequences for Econometrics 
This view of eaommic theory as forcibly treating fluctuating objects has 
implicadm with regard to empirical applications: Economics presup 
poses that the economic variables under consideration are governed by 
laws which are changing over time. The data are the coefficients 
entering the laws. Since 'the data are not explain'ed themselves - else 
10 Keynes (3) p 296ff. Incidentally, this view explains the striving for generality in 
economics which puzzles philosophers of science. Hamminga (p. 8) writes, for 
example: "If a theorem holds in many worlds that can be expressed in the economist's 
language rhe probability of a theorem to be true in our real world is high, even without 
considering at all what our real world exactly is like", and he finds this view somewhat 
funny although it underlies, according to him, the economists' notion of scientifx 
progress The underlying - and sound - view of the economists is, of course, that we 
cannot presuppose a definite real world since we cannot know it, and since it is 
everchanging. Hence only theorems which remain valid in a changing world are of 
interest Hayek stresses the same by saying that economic theories are bound to be 
"algebraic" for that reason, and Keynes writes likewise: "To convert a model in a 
quantitative formula is to destroy its usefulness as an instrument of thought . .. To do 
so would make it useless as a model" (see Hayek ( ) p. 338 and Keynes (3) pp. 2H. 
2%). 
they would be endogeneous variables - they must be permitted to 
change erratically. According to the isolation principle they are permitted 
to change only slowly. Hence this slow change of the coefficients is the 
basic premise econometrics has to start from. Chapter 4 ("Econometric 
Implications") discusses a method for estimating economic relations 
starting from that assumption. 
1.3 Intricacies in Macroeconomic Analysis 
.3. Economic Aggregates and Macroeconomic Problems 
In macroeconomics we are interested in the determinants of broad 
economic aggregates: What determines the price level, the level of 
unemployment, the growth rate, the balance of payments? We might 
even pose similar questions on a slightly more disaggregated level: What 
determines the price level of a certain group of products, the level of 
unemployment of a certain group of individuals, the growth rate of a 
particular industry, or its contribution to foreign trade? But we are not 
so much interested in the particular prices, in the employment situation 
of a particular individual, or in the foreign trade balance of an indi- 
vidual firm. I 
There are two types of economic aggregates: Aggregate quantities 
and aggregate agents". Aggregate quantities are those numbers we 
typically deal with in macroeconomics: gross national product, labor 
productivity, the price level, the rate of unemployment, and so forth. 
* 
These are broad indices summing up various microeconomic quantities. 
Aggregate agents are obtained by grouping together microeconomic 
agents and by conceiving these groups as units acting and reacting in 
certain ways. Typical aggregate agents are industries, sections of the 
work force, sectors of the economy, and the government. 
Macroeconomic problems, then, relate to the determinants of the 
behaviour of economic aggregates: What determines the price level?; 
what determines the behaviour of an industry?; etc. 
1 1  One might, perhaps, also conceive of something like "aggregate institutions", but since 
we will not consider institutional analysis at all, this discussion is omitted for the sake ' 
of simplicity. 
1.3.2 The Microeconomic Approach to Macroeconomic Problems 
One can try to answer macroeconomic questions by considering explicitly 
the microeconomic quantities and agents and looking for the. cor- 
responding macroeconomic implications. If macroeconomic problems 
can be tackled successfully in such a way, this is very satisfactory; but 
very often they cannot. 
The reason is, basically, the following: The most general micro- 
economic' models are so all-inclusive that they can explain virtually all 
macroeconomic outcomes 12. In order to obtain definite conclusions with 
regard to aggregate consequences, we have to impose additional 
microeconomic restrictions on them, but it is very difficult to formulate 
restrictions which can be imposed on. the behaviour of all microeconomic 
agents, and it is practically impossible to obtain all the necessary data to 
verify them, let alone to describe the behaviour of all microeconomic 
agents exactly 13. 
1.3.3 The Macroeconomic mic roach to Macroeconomic Problems 
To avoid the difficulties of using microeconomic approaches to macro- 
economic problems, macroeconomic theory looks at the behaviour of 
aggregate agents and aggregate quantities directly. This approach has 
the definite advantages that the problems that interest us are put into 
focus from tlw*eginning, and economic aggregates can be observed 
much dore easily, since official statistics are available. It has, however, 
the definite disadvantage that we do not know how the behaviour of the 
macroeconomic agents comes about since it is explicitly left open how 
microeconomic activity ieads to exactly those macro relations we start 
with. 
12 As Sonnemchein and Debreu have shown, the general equilibrium model implies 
essentially w restrictions on the shape of the excess demand functions and hence on 
possible equilibria Lexis has argued alike as long ago as 1895. The same holds true, a 
fortiori, f a  the so-called "Keynesian" generalizations of the general equilibrium model 
(Benassy) since they include general equilibrium as a special case. 
13 There is one promising attempt to derive properties of market demand functions by 
putting reseictiom on income distribution, rather than on individual demand functions 
(Hildenbrand). Note, however, that the strategy here is to describe a class of micro- 
economic models leading to a presupposed macro outcome, and postulating the macro 
outcome directly involves the smallest number of minoeconomic restrictions. Provid- 
ing some possible minoeconomic underpinnings raises, however, the plausibility of the 
direct macro assumption. 
With regard to many important questions, macroeconomic analysis 
is simply unavoidabe since no microeconomic theories are available 
which could be used: Business cycle theory, foreign trade theory, 
unemployment theory, the theory of distribution, or monetary theory 
proceed in aggregate terms from the outset, for instance, and we have 
only macroeconomic tools. 
1.3.4 The Henneneutic Aggregation Problem 
If we do macroeconomic analysis - that is, aggregative analysis without 
explicit microeconomic foundations - several problems arise. The first 
is: How can we expect stable macroeconomic relations to exist? Are not 
those macroeconomic postulates we start with merely fictions as long as 
no explicit microeconomic foundation is providedI4? Or is it less 
demanding to postulate the existence of stable macroeconomic relations 
than to postulate stable microeconomic relations? Further, how should 
we envisage the connexion between microeconomic and macroeconomic 
laws in principle, and what is the nature of those macroeconomic 
relations we work with? All this constitutes what might be termed the 
henneneutic aggregation problem. It is to be distinguished from the 
technical aggregation problem which consists in describing a known 
microeconomic system in aggregate terms. 
Chapter 5 deals with the aggregation problem from the hermeneutic 
perspective. It argues that macroeconomic analysis proceeds by em- 
ploying certain ceteris paribus clauses, and that aggregative relations 
can be described by a generalization of the moving equilibrium method. 
Furthermore it is argued that macroeconomic relations are generally 
more stable than microeconomic relations. ) 
1.3.5 The Typical Agent 
But how can one generate hypotheses concerning the behaviour of 
aggregate agents? This is usually done by conceiving typical micro- 
economic agents - a typical firm, a typical household - and by assuming 
that all microeconomic agents are typical agents. It is usually rather easy 
to deduce the behaviour of aggregate agents from these premises, and 
the resulting aggregate relations are the relations we start with in 
14 see Menger, p. 87. 
macroeconomics. This is quite reasonable if we can safely assume that 
the behaviour of the typical agents dominates the behaviour of the 
aggregates, and the various microeconomic idiosyncrasies either do not 
matter too much macroeconomically, or else cancel each other. Further- 
more, the construction makes sure that the macroeconomic relations we 
start with involve no logical contradiction, since there is at least one 
microeconomic model - namely that involving only typical agents - 
which is compatible with our macroeconomic hypotheses. It is of course 
never maintained that all microeconomic agents actually are typical. 
The notion of a typical microeconomic agent is simply a theoretical 
device for deriving plausible macroeconomic assumptions. 
1.3.6 The Representative Agent 
If we have obtained hypotheses on the behaviour of aggregate agents in 
this manner, we might ask ourselves whether we can look at these 
agents as following certain maxims of behaviour and acting under 
certain constraints such that their behaviour can be explained by this 
construction. Is the behaviour of antindustry such that we can envisage 
it as being the behaviour of one single firm striving for profit 
maximization (or something else), or can the behaviour of the household 
sector be conceived of as the behaviour of one single household striving 
for utility maximization (or something else)? If this can be done, we call 
the agent a representative agent, and such a construction might be very 
helpful in elud&ting macroeconomic issues. 
1.3.7 Micro and Macro Behaviour Might Differ 
If all households are identical, and no interaction occurs among them, 
the behaviour of the typical household will appropriately describe the 
behaviour of the household sector. In such a case the typical household 
can be taken to be the representative household. 
But in many cases it is quite misleading to identify the typical and 
the representative agent. An industry might .grow although all firms 
shrink in size, and the consumption habits of individual households 
might be influenced by the consumption of other households, but no 
reference group effects are possible for the representative household, 
since it stands alone. Examples such as these give only the simplest cases 
where the behaviour of the typical agent deviates from that of the cor- 
responding representative agent, but they illustrate already that micro 
and macro behaviour might differ. Sometimes this difference might even 
be more drastic. We might envisage representative agents for instance 
having no counterpart in any typical microeconomic agent at all. The 
discussion of the hermeneutic aggregation problem in Chap. 5 is 
intended to contribute to a proper understanding of these somewhat 
complex micro-macro transformations 15. 
1.3.8 Microeconomics and Aggregation 
The aggregation problem is most conspicuously present in macro- 
economics and will be discussed in that respect in this book. It seems to 
me to be a more fundamental problem, however, referring to micro- 
economics as well. Since most readers will not agree, let me explain. 
Economics is interested in general tendencies rather than in the 
idiosyncrasies of particular cases. Hence it aims to devise representative 
concepts from the beginning, i.e. modes of behaviour and circumstances 
elucidating general regularities rather than historical noise. This interest 
in general tendencies holds true for microeconomics, too, as long as we 
employ assumptions like profit maximization or utility maximization. 
We assume thereby that these motives are dominant and other possible 
motives and resulting modes of behaviour can be ignored. But this 
means, of course, that we do nat start explicitly from all the particulari- 
ties of individual cases. ~ a t h d r  we start from representative notions 
directly, and this involves the aggregation problem from the outset. 
Although we might feel that it is less important in microeconomics than 
in macroeconomics, it is still there. Consider the reasons for assuming 
profit maximization or utility maximization as dominant motives. We 
might be convinced that these motives explain competitively viable 
actions and are enforced upon the agents through competitive pres- 
15 I have introduced the two concepts of "typical" and "representative" agents in order to 
stress this difference from the beginning. The distinction is also present in Marshall 
(p. 381, snalso Bliss).but is somewhat bf& because he uses the term representative 
' agent in. both meanin@, and this has hew: overlooked quite often Clower (p. 290) 
writes, for instance, with regard to the concept of aggregate demand: "In short, Keynes 
either had a dual decision hypothesis at the-back of his mind, or most of the General 
Theory is theoretical nousensew and proceeds from that argument to introduce the 
Keynesian notions into microeconomics, initiating thereby the "Keynesian" microeco- 
nomic models which are intended to give microeconomic underpinnings to Keynesian 
I%XIQ theories. But a possible validity of the dual dekision hypothesis on the macro 
level does not at all imply that it is also valid on the micro level. See also Hahn, p. 35. 
suresL6. This amounts to starting from properties of the competitive 
system in explaining individual actions rather than deriving these 
properties from individual actions stringently, and in this. sense the 
argument can be interpreted as being derived from a macroeconomic, or 
even holistic, approach ". 
1.4 Isolation and Aggregation 
In dealing with partial issues, economics presupposes isolation; in 
starting from representative or aggregate notions, it presupposes 
aggregation. These are not separate issues, however; rather aggregative 
analysis can be viewed as a special case in isolation in that it neglects 
certain influences, termed "structural", and uses the ceteris paribus 
clause to fix these influences in the same way as other data are fixed in 
partial analysis. This, at least, is the view proposed here. 
The plan of the book is as follows. Chapter 2 discusses isolation, 
Chaps. 3 and 4 elaborate some consequences, and Chap. 5 discusses the 
aggregation problem by interpreting macroeconomics as employing an 
isolating approach. 
16 See Alchian on that 
17 We shall come back to this and similar questions in Sect 5.5. 

2. On Isolation 
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a 
machine, or metbod of blind manipulation, 
which will furnish an infallible answer, but to 
provide ourselves with an organiscd and 
orderly mahod of thinldng out pamcular 
problem. . . 
John Maynard Keynes 
2.1 The Heuristic View 
The isolating approach, or ceteris paribus analysis, is as old as 
economics. Alfred Marshall, who has developed it most succinctly, 
characterises it as follows. 
The forces to be dealt with (in economics) are,however so numerous, that it is best to take 
a few at a time; and to work out a number of partial solutions as auxiliaries to our main 
study. Thus we begin by isolating the primary relations of supply, demand and price in 
regard to a particular commodity. We reduce to inaction al l  other forces by the phrase 
"other things being equal": We do not suppose that they are inert, but for the time we 
ignore their activity. This scientific device is a great deal older than science: it is the 
method by which, consciously or unconsciously, sensible men have dealt from time 
immemorial with every difficult problem of ordinary life (Marshall, p. xiii). 
This view, even if not correct in that generality, seems to be vindicated 
within the economic compass: The isolating approach appears to be a 
characteristic feature of economic analysis - consciously or uncon- 
sciously. Even if some economists held other methodological views, their 
actual work has been ceteris paribus analysis. Keynes put it bluntly: 
"This is the nature of economic thinking" (Keynes ( I ) ,  p. 297). 
The isolating approach will be delineated in the following as a 
heuristic procedure. No attempt will be made to develop any meth- 
odology, i.e. that this and that are the criteria for any true scientific 
procedure and everything else is devoid of meaning. 
It seems obvious to me that any method can have only heuristic 
value since it is bound to prove itself fruitful in dealing with its subject, 
and nothing can be prophesised here (Adorno (I ) ,  pp. 11 3, 11 8 ff.). To 
develop a method without any idea of its subject seems to imply drawing 
conclusions without any presuppositions, an attempt which is bound to 
fail. 
Hence our ideas about the nature of the subject determine consciously 
or uncollsciously our methods '. Since the nature of the subject is to be 
1 Cf. also Hayek (2) p. 332 
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clarified by our enquiry, our thoughts about the subject will yield 
retroactions changing our ideas and our methods. The choice of a 
certain method mirrors our expectations, our conjectures or our longings 
for certain regularities. We ought to be flexible here. 
We shall exclude from the discussion two other important aspects of 
methodology pertaining not to the nature of its subject but to the con- 
ditions of social success of a theory: One the one hand a theory ought to 
correspond to our natural cognitive dispositions (the structure of our 
brain, the "hardware"); on the other hand it ought to comply to the 
social conditions influencing our thinking (the social programming of 
our thoughts and the encouragement or suppression of certain tendencies 
of thought within a social system). These are questions in physiology, 
psychology, and sociology. All curtailments of thought emerging here 
limit their own foundation. If a theory were developed, for instance, that 
all thinking is simply a correlate of extrascientific individual or group 
interests, this theory would have to be judged accordingly. If the theory 
were explicitly exempted from its own judgement, however, the tradi- 
tional and unconditional claim of theory would be vindicated: The 
claim for truth. This claim - whether it can be vindicated or not - is the 
implicit premise of any discourse (Sebag, p. 9). Any discussion about it 
seems to be futile, therefore. 
Sometimes the question of social success of a theory is posed in a 
normative spirit: What are the criteria of scientific procedure assuring 
intersubjective verification? This question will also be disregarded in the 
following. That it is not necessaAy appropriate to the particular subject 
matter has been remarked already. Furthermore, the criteria developed 
in this vein seem to be highly arbitrary: If a theory fails to meet them it 
remains open whether this is due to shortcomings of the theory itself or 
whether the intellectual scope of the implicitly hypothesized average 
individual is too restricted (Adorno (2), pp. 49 ff.). For our purposes, 
therefore, it might be sufficient to adopt the position that a theory which 
has proved to be communicable has thereby cleared the hurdle of inter- 
subjective verification. This implies nothing, of course, with respect to its 
intrinsic value or relevance which are always matters of experience; but 
this experience cannot be automatized by applying a set of formal rules. 
Given these problems it seems wise to exclude methodological 
quarrels from our further discussion. The characterization of the 
isolating approach which we are going to propose is therefore without 
any methodological pretensions. We are simply leaning back, gaining 
some distance from economists' customary activities and a general view. 
The following discussion is meant to serve its purpose like a concert 
critique which we read in the morning paper and which discusses the 
previous night's performance in words rather than in music. Whilst 
raising points of agreement or disagreement, it leads us to realize our 
previous sensations and structural discernments more consciously and 
more deeply. Comparable to a concert critique, which makes sense only 
with reference to music, while losing all its meaning if taken in 
isolation, the following is an attempt to delineate some figures of 
economic thought in another language. 
Reverting to the old patterns of economic reasoning might entail 
some wnsequences apart from avoiding futile controversies based on 
mutual misunderstanding, however A foundation for an understanding 
of the nature of macroeconomic laws - to be discussed in Chap. 5 - and 
a proper econometric modelling of ceteris paribus clauses - discussed in 
Chap. 4 - can among other things be provided thereby. 
2.2 The Isolating Approach 
2.2.1 The Marshallian Method 
Marshall describes the isolating approach as follows. 
It is sometimes said that the laws of economics are 'hypothetical'. Of course, like every 
other science, it undertakes to study the effects which will be produced by certain causes, 
not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things are equal, and that causes are 
able to work out their effects undisturbed. Almost every scientific doctrine, when carefully 
and formally stated, will be found to contain some proviso to the effect that other things 
are equal: The action of the causes in question is supposed to be isolated; certain effects are 
attributed to them, but only on the hypothesis that no cause is permitted to enter except 
those distinctly allowed for. It is true however that the condition that time must be allowed 
for causes to produce their effects is a source of great difficulty in economics. For 
meanwhile the material on which they work, and perhaps even the causes themselves, may 
have changed; and the tendencies which are being described will not have a sufficiently 
'long run' in which to work themselves out fully. 
The ceteris paribus clause - the hypothetical premise that all other in- 
fluences not explicitly mentioned are taken to be constant - isolates a 
certain set of relationships from its context .The explanation of the 
2 Hence our considerations are concerned with the "rhetoric of economics" in the sense 
outlined by McCloskey. 
3 Marshall p. 30. See also Marshall p. 304. 
behaviour of certain variables starts fiQm data which are generated by a 
ceteris paribus clause: everything other than the variables is assumed to 
be constant '. 
2.2.2 Substantive and Hypothetical Isolation 
Disregarding the influence of disturbing causes by means of a ceteris 
paribus clause can be interpreted in two different ways: 
In the first place, we might disregard those causes because they are 
unimportant. They do not significantly affect the relationships under 
study, and do not supersede or destroy them. If this holds true, we have 
performed what will be termed a substantive isolation. 
In the second place we might use the ceteris paribus clause purely 
hypothetically, disregarding important influences for a while to narrow 
down the issue to a partial one which can be handled theoretically more 
easily. This might be a first step of an intellectual device to compose a 
coherent picture by later combining various partial answers so obtained. 
If we deduce the impact of a price change on demand by combining the 
income effect and the substitution effect, we combine two hypothetical 
effects to produce a substantive answer. While studying hypothetical 
effects, we have performed a hypothetical isolation5. We shall employ 
the same term irrespective of whether our hypothetical deductions are 
devised as building blocks for a; theory of substantive contents, or are 
viewed as being of interest for their own sake '. 
4 Sometimes the constancy assumption refers not to the level of exogeneous variables 
themselves but to their law of motion which is taken to be constant (in growth theory, 
for instance). The exogeneity of data rather than their constancy is their essential 
feature. We can still proceed, however, to talk about constant data if we take the laws 
of motion, or the parameters describing them (growth rates for instance), as data rather 
then the exogeneous variables themselves. This might vindicate the simplification used 
henceforth in the text 
5 In Marshall, the distinction between these two types of isolation remains vague; he 
isolates in a substantivist spirit throughout, cf. Marshall, p. 304, for example. On the 
other hand, Schumpeter blurs the issue by maintaining: "This is always possible: 
anything can be labeled as  a datum, which simply means that we give up the hunt for 
a purely economic explanation of whatever it is we so describe" (Schumpeter (1). 
p. 665). In w t h e r  context he draws, however, a distinction between faulty and 
faultless isolatim without saying what this means (Schumpeter (1) p. 538). The 
present discussion focuses on this distinction 
6 As a matter of terminology we shall employ the notions of abstraction and isolation 
synonymously in the following. (Abstracting from certain influenced means isolating a 
phenomenon in this regard from these influences.) Compare Schumpeter (1) p. 538 
who uses the same terminology. 
The distinction drawn here between substantive and hypothetical 
isolation is in practice not always a sharp one, of course. Rather it 
represents two polar cases with distinct and different implicit-premises 
and purposes, and a different logic. The following sections will elaborate 
on these logical aspects. We do not preclude, however, these aspects 
being intermingled in actual work. Nevertheless it might be helpful to 
distinguish the two cases in order to adequately assess the meaning of 
particular segments of economic analysis. 
2.3 Substantive Isolation 
2.3. : T h e  Isolation Principle 
In freezing some factors by means of the ceteris paribus clause, we 
transform them into data of our analy,sis. The choice of these data is not, 
however, simply a matter of caprice if the isolation is intended to be of 
substantive relevance. A substantive isolation requires those factors trans- 
formed into data by means of the ceteris paribus clause have to be 
suflciently stable with regard to the processes we want to explain such 
that the movements of the data do not destroy or supersede the relations 
we are studyzng in our model. This is the isolation principle. If it is 
satisfied, the results obtained in a partial model will continue to hold 
approximately true even if we make allowance for these movements. If 
the isolation principle is not satisfied, however, we have abstracted from 
significant factors and will have obtained misleading results. 
The isolation principle has two different aspects: temporal and 
causaI isolation. The following sections deal with these two aspects. 
2.3.2 Temporal Isolation 
The problem of temporal isolation is emphasized by Marshal repeat- 
edly. He stresses, for instance, that it "is true, however, that the condi- 
tion that time must be allowed for causes to produce their effects i s  a 
source of great difficulty in economics" '. He refers here to the require- 
ment that the adjustment of variables to the constellation determined by 
the data of the model be sufficiently fast in order that we may abstract 
from changes in the data. 
7 Marshall p. 30. See also Marshall p. 304. 
Consider for instance a partial model which gives the result that a 
vector x of certain variables converges to an equilibrium f: 
The equilibrium vector f is in turn determined by the data of the 
model. In particular, it is dependent upon those factors fixed under a 
ceteris paribus clause. These factors are actually changing, however, and 
this induces a movement of the equilibrium n over time. If this 
movement is sufficiently slow, the proposition that x tends towards X 
will remain approximately valid in the sense, for instance, that x tends 
towards f if it is not already very close to P. If, on the other hand, the 
movement of the equilibrium values n is rather fast, the distance 
between x and n might even increase, the target X might move faster 
than the missile x. In that case the proposition that x tends to f ,  which 
we have derived under the ceteris paribus clause, will actually be wrong 
and a tendency of x towards n cannot be isolated in a substantive sense. 
More generally the temporal isolation principle can be formulated as 
follows: A relationship is isolated in a temporal sense if the actual move- 
ment of the factors frozen under a ceteris paribus clause is not so fast that 
it destroys or supersedes the relationships derived in the model. In short, 
the change of the data is required to be slow as compared to the speed 
of the changes in the variables under discussion. 
2.3.3 Causal Isolation 
A distinct, albeit not unrelated, aspect of isolation is the causal aspect, 
This is stressed by Eucken in a famous passage: "Economic data are 
those factors which determine the economic universe without being in- 
fluenced directly by economic facts themselves."' With regard to our 
problem, and in dealing with partial analysis, we might rephrase this by 
saying that the factors taken as data of the analysis ought not be in- 
fluenced directly by the processes or variables studied. If there are 
significant retroactions on the data of our model from the movements 
analyzed in that very model, the isolation becomes hypothetical. Since 
this holds true quite irrespective of whether the retroactions are direct or 
indirect, we shall speak henceforth of retroactions, and not solely of 
"direct retroactions". 
8 Eucken p. 243, my translation. 
Consider for instance a vector of variables x which has been shown 
to tend to an equilibrium vector n in a partial model: 
The equilibrium X might depend in turn on the variables x directly or 
through their actual influence on other variables which we have fixed 
under a ceteris paribus clause, and the tendency of x to its equilibrium X 
might be destroyed. If, on the other hand, this retroaction is sufficiently 
weak, our proposition x -r X will be of substantive contents, and a 
causal isolation has been made. 
More generally the causal isolation principle can be phrased as 
follows: A set of relations is isolated in the causal sense if the actual 
retroactions of the movement of variables studied in the model on the data 
of the model, which have been generated by a ceteris paribus clause, is not 
so pronounced ar to destroy or supersede the relationships derived in ihe 
partial model. Put more bluntly, the retroactions of the variables on the 
data ought to be sufficiently weak. 
2-4 Hypothetical Isolation 
2.4.1 Analytical Isolation 
In studying a complex problem it is, in Marshall's words, "necessary for 
man with his limited powers to go step by step; breaking up a complex 
question, studying one bit at a time, and at last combining his partial 
solutions into a more or less complete solution of the whole riddle." 1; 
so doing, we might use the ceteris paribus clause, which generates the 
frame for each partial problem, solely for analytical convenience: We 
perform an analytical isolation without any intention of producing 
answers of substantive contents. We produce various theoretical com- 
ponents and aim to gain substantive implications when we combine 
them into an integral whole. Its sole purpose being simplification, the 
device of analytical isolation can be used arbitrarily. 
9 Marshall p. 304. 
2.4.2 Hypothetical Theories 
We might, however, construct purely hypothetical theories for their own 
sake and without any attempt to use them later on A component parts 
of more realistic theories, as Marshall writes: "If we shut our eyes to 
realities we may construct an edifice of pure crystal by imaginations, 
that will throw side lights on real problems; and might conceivably be 
of interest to beings who had no economic problems at all like our own. 
Such playful excursions are often suggestive in unexpected ways: They 
afford good training to the mind: and seem to be productive only of 
good, so long as their purpose is clearly understood" lo. 
We might, for instance, develop a theory of an imaginated barter 
economy while knowing for certain that a monetary economy works 
essentially differently. Nevertheless, the barter model, the edifice of 
crystal, might help us to understand much more deeply the crucially 
different features of a monetary economy. Similarly we might learn a lot 
about why our present institutions exist by analysing the difficulties of 
alternative hypothetical social arrangements such as labor manage- 
ment". It might also be useful to develop purely hypothetical theories 
for other purposes: creating a theoretical or normative reference point, 
or handicrafting matchbox-sized models which permit us to analogize 
with regard to real economic problems. (If these analogies are thought 
to be a substantive rather than purely formal nature, we pass over from 
hypothetical to substantive isojation, of course.) Hence hypothetical 
theories might be quite useful and even important - as long as their 
purpose is clearly understood. 
2.4.3 A Remark on Scientific Discourse 
In contrasting substantive and hypothetical isolation, we have tried to 
stress that the isolations and abstractions encountered in economics 
10 Marshall p. 644. 
Pigou sees things differently, however: 
None the less, the thought-tools of the economist are, I think, in themselves and for 
their own sake of little interest and importance. The pure mathematician would protest 
- and rightly - if anyone should regard his structures as merely tools for physics and 
other applied sciences. But then these structures - if one who knows them by repute 
may venture to speak - constitute immense and imposing triumphs of the human 
intellect: they are themselves works of art. No claim of that kind can be made for the 
structure of pure economics. These are tools only. Those of them which c a m t  be made 
to work in elucidating the problems of the real world must be scrapped: there is no 
place for them in the gallery of art. But, though they are only tools, as tools they are 
vital. (Quotation taken from Lindahl p. 23 n.). . 
11 This is the characteristic feature of 0. Williamson's "organizational failures approach". 
differ in nature and purpose, this difference being perfectly legitimate so 
long as the particular purpose of each type of isolation is clearly 
understood. - 
It might be argued, however, that allowing for hypothetical theories 
implies that everything will be permitted to sail under the flag of 
economic science, the barest nonsense included, since every contribution 
can be vindicated as being either substantive or hypothetical. This plea 
is, however, theoretically misleading and practically the opposite of the 
truth. 
The objection is theoretically misleading because a discrimination of 
theories according to their various possible purposes and claims requires 
that these claims can be named; and theories can be judged in a two- 
step procedure: First by evaluating to what extent these particular 
claims are met, and second by evaluating the relevance of the claims. 
The first step requires immanent criticism, provoking arguments as to 
why the claims are not met and what the particular shortcomings are, 
and counter arguments which might serve to delineate the meaning of 
the theory more sharply, extending or contracting its scope. Hence there 
is room for criticism and wuntercritic$m. 
Discussions of this type seem to be most fruitful since they tend to 
generate generalizations of existing and new theories. Apodictic pro- 
grammes starting from a definition of some "true scientific procedure" 
will not. As Adorno says, "anything and nothing can be disproved from 
without"'*. Or, in Marshall's words, there is a "general rule that in 
discussions on method and scope, a man is nearly sure to be right when 
affirming the usefulness of his own procedure, and wrong when denying 
that of others" 13. 
Although we might still think the quality of a theory to be 
dependent on the relevance of its claims and on how far these claims a& 
met, we will avoid futile controversies by bracketing out the problem 
that certain theories may have to be abandoned because they are unable 
to answer certain questions (which they were not intended to answer in 
the first place). 
In practice, the banishment of hypothetical theories will not induce 
more relevant research but will vindicate possibly abstruse hypothetical 
theories. Criticizing a theory because it has no .practical application and 
is hence hypothetical and irrelevant implies that all hypothetical 
theories are irrelevant, but such an assertion is felt by most theorists to 
12 Adorno (I) p 117. 
1 3 Marshall p. 637 n 2. 
be patently wrong. Hence this argument will not be convincing even if 
the theory under discussion is unreasonable in other respects 14. Hence 
excluding hypothetical theories from "true science7' will lead to a de 
facto immunization of these theories, and it seems more fruitful to focus 
the discussion on determining more exactly the scope, meaning and 
possible generalizations of the theories under consideration. 
2.5 Economic Thinking 
Economic thinking proceeds by imagination: By imagining economic 
processes, actions, and reactions we gain insight into their inner 
necessity. This is neither more subjective, nor more objective, than any 
other thinking. 
Biihm-Bawerk has stressed this point in the context of capital theory 
superbly. He writes: 
- 
I believe that the aberrations and confusions which we observe in this field are to a large 
extent due to an underestimation of certain difficulties which arise here, and to a resulting 
inattentiveness. To master the problems of capital theory involves - as anyone who has 
tried his skill here will feel - many deductive operations on imagined facts. 
And because so many factors are interacting here, the chains of deductive reasoning 
attain a precarious length. The dangers involved in these long chains of reasoning have 
been stressed most appropriately by Marshall, albeit partly for different reasons. 
I think our most dangerous enem9 in those long chains of reasoning is the word It 
ought to be a verbal veil only, suggesting vivid imaginations. But in how far we are 
following this suggestion, to what extent we are using our creative power to evoke the ap- 
propriate imagination, that is another question. But if we are somewhat careless, relying on 
the familiar word in guileless confidence, and are not creating the right imaginations in our 
mind, the word will serve as a veil in a different and undesired sense: It will veil the true 
contours oP the economic ideas which we lose while being satisfied with the accidental 
silhouettes of the verbal image. And if these veiling words permeate long chains of reason- 
ing, there is no assurance that the veiled imaginations with their unyielding features fit 
together. This might lead to dialectical conclusions drawn from strings of words, resulting 
in ominous dialectical derailments which we find in so many long-chained deductions but 
particularily in those heedless deductions encountered in capital theory 15. 
14 Hence the many attacks on general equilibrium theory which elaborate on its 
supposedly purely hypothetical nature and conclude therefrom that it is useless 
altogether seem to cast away the good with the bad; the assaults by Galbraith and 
Kaldor might serve as examples here. These attacks remain therefore largely futile. The 
importance of general equilibrium in elucidating various issues seems to be patent: 
how else can one discuss the shortcomings of the price system with regard to exter- 
nalities in a different framework, for instance? 
15 Biihm-Bawerk p. Xff. In view of Biihm-Bawerk's beautiful German, I have been able 
to give here only a particularly inadequate translation. For the original, and a brief 
discussion of Biihm-BawerKs notion of dialectics, see Schlicht (S), p. 47. 
I am tempted to add that the mathematical symbol might be as 
dangerous as the word if it stands for purely mathematical rather than 
economic notions 16. 
If we conceive economic theories without this background of 
economic imaginations, we will be unable to assess the significance of 
the underlying abstractions and isolations, and it will be practically 
impossible to appraise the significance and the empirical implications of 
those theories. No physicist would reject the law of the pendulum 
because the rope holding the pendulum happens to break. Rather he 
will know from h s  theoretical imagination that this accident constitutes 
a significant change in his test conditions, not an insignificant influence 
such as, for instance, a change in the number of persons watching the 
experiment. The problem of isolating essential aspects is similar in 
economics. To stress the isolation principle and the distinction between 
substantive and hypothetical isolation is to aim to conceive and 
delineate the meaning of economic theories with reference to broader 
(real or imagined) economic processes. 
16 Keynes (1) p. 297 writes with respect to the hazards of mathematical symbolism: 
It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of formalizing a system of 
economic analysis [. . .] that they expressly assume strict independence between the 
factors involved and lose all their cogency and authority if this hypothesis is disallowed; 
whereas, in ordinary discourse, where we are not blindly manipulating but know all the 
time what we are doing and what the words mean, we can keep 'at the back of our 
heads' the necessary reserves and qualifications and the adjustments which we shall 
have to make later on, in a way we cannot keep complicated partial differentials 'at the 
back' of several pages of algebra which assume that they all vanish. 
This comment seems to me to correspond for mathematical symbols to what Biihm- 
Bawerk has said about words. Seen together, these two views imply that neither 
mathematical nor nonmathematical methods exclude 'blind manipulation' from the 
outset. In view of the transparency which can gained by using mathematical symbols, 
and which might be helpful in avoiding blind manipulation, Keynes' rph  judgement 
seems to me to deserve qualification, however. 

3. The Moving Equilibrium Method 
Statics is really but a branch of Dynamics, and 
partly because all suggestions as to economic 
rest, of which the hypothesis of a Stationary 
State is the chief, are merely provisional, used 
only to illustrate particular steps in the 
argument, and to be thrown aside when that 
is done. 
Alfred Marshall 
3.1 Economic Equilibrium 
Economic laws are, in Marshall's felicitous phrase, laws of tendencies: 
statements regarding the impact of various influences, more or less 
certain, more or less definite (Marshall p. 27). If these tendencies have 
worked themselves out fully, equilibrium is reached. Hence an equilib- 
rium state is a state towards which things are tending. It might be, 
however, that an equilibrium is never reached since time is required for 
the causes to work out their effects: "For meanwhile the material on 
which they work, and perhaps eve@ the causes themselves, may have 
changed; and the tendencies which are being described will not have a 
sufficiently 'long run' in which to work themselves out fully '." But even 
if this holds true and the moving equilibria are never reached, the 
notion of such equilibria might still be helpful to describe the 
tendencies at work. This is the theme of the present chapter. 
The equilibrium notion underlying this discussion is the Marshallian 
one which has been sketched above. It is certainly only one of a host of 
various equilibrium notions used in economics. It is beyond the-scope of 
the present considerations to offer a comprehensive discussion here, but a 
few remarks might be in place *. 
The analytical equilibrium notion refers to a rest point, which, if 
attained, will perpetuate. This notion is closely related to the MarshaJIian 
one: A Mmhallian equilibrium is an analytical equilibrium which is 
stable 3. 
The Swedish equilibrium notion refers to a state where expectations 
are fulfilled. A Swedish equilibrium can be an analytical (or Marshall- 
ian) disequilibrium since the state might change - even if correctly 
anticipated. This concept is important in microeconomics, particularly 
1 Marshall p. 30. 
2 Some references and a more detailed elaboration of the following remarks can be found 
in Schlicht (4). 
3 See p. 30, n. 6 on the stability concepts used in this book 
in game theory where it is expected that everybody selects his best 
strategy given the best strategies of the others. 
In macroeconomics the Swedish equilibrium notion poses the dif- 
ficulty, however, of unclarity about what is meant by the expectations, 
or plans of an aggregate, since the aggregate has no conscience of.its 
own. Furthermore, we might like to talk about equilibria resulting from 
actions based on mutually inconsistent expectations - an equilibrium 
between bulls and bears, for instance - and here the Swedish notion is 
clearly inapplicable. The basic idea underlying this notion is, however, 
that a disappointment of expectations will lead to revisions of expecta- 
tions and plans, and hence to changes; in that it boils down to the 
analytical notion. We might still want to speak, however, about a short- 
run equilibrium involving disappointed expectations, which induces 
changes in expectations leading to another short run equilibrium which 
might disappoint expectations again, and so forth. Here the Swedish 
notion poses problems, and it seems most appropriate therefore, to 
avoid it in our further discussion4. 
The Walrasian equilibrium notion refers to market clearance: A 
market is in Walrasian equilibrium if supply equals demand. A 
Walrasian equilibrium can be a Swedish disequilibrium, and vice 
versa, since agents might expect that a market will not clear; and it can 
be a Marshallian (or analytical) disequilibrium, and vice versa, if there 
are tendencies at work which produce uncleared markets. Furthermore 
it is restricted to models wheie supply and demand can be defined 
unambiguously - which is not the case if we allow for monopolies, 
buffer stocks and inventories, or other complications. In order to avoid 
these problems, we shall not employ the Walrasian notion either. 
These brief remarks might encourage us in our reliance on the 
Marshallian and the analytical equilibrium notions: It is not maintained 
that other possible notions are useless, since they are certainly fruitful 
in many particular applications. Rather they are not sufficiently broad 
for our more general purposes. It is to be kept in mind, however, that 
the term "equilibrium" is fairly ambiguous as long as we do not make 
clear which particular notion we are employing, and that we shall stick 
to the Marshallian one. 
4 The Hahn notion of equilibrium - namely "that an economy is in equilibrium when it 
generates messages which do not cause agents to change the theories they hold or the 
policies which they pursue" - poses the same difficulty. It improves upon the Swedish 
equilibrium notion, however, in that it makes clear what "disappointment of cxpecta- 
tions" means if expectations assign probabilities to various possibilities rather than 
refer to one particular expected set of circumstances (see Hahn p. 25). 
3.2. Moving Equilibria 
3.2.1 Partial Analysis 
Consider an economy and its laws of motion. Denote the state of the 
economy by s. For our purposes it is sufficient to take s as a real k 
vector. The laws of motion of the economy can be viewed as a set of 
differential equations associating to each state s the change of state S 
over time 
S=Y(s) S , S E  lRk. 
If (3.1) represents the true economy, it will be very complex, and of 
high dimensionality, involving psychological, biological, meteorological, 
and physical laws. Hence we will be unable to write it down explicitly 
although we might still think that it can be conceived by a superior 
brain. Hence we are forced to do partial analysis. 
In partial analysis, we proceed as follows. We split the vector s 
describing the state of the economy into a vector x E Rm of fast 
variables and the vector y E Wn, n = k - m of the remaining slow 
variables. Without loss of generality we can write the laws of motion 
given in (3.1) equivalently as 
and we can proceed to analyse the partial model (3.2) separately by 
fixing the slow variables y under a ceteris paribus clause. If we have 
labelled only a few variables as fast, the partial model might be rather 
simple and accessible to analytical treatment. 
The conclusions drawn from the partial model will be of substantive 
relevance, we hope, if we can be sure that the speed of movement of 
the slow variables y (without, however knowing their law of motion) is 
in fact sufficiently slow as compared to the movements of the fast 
variables x. This is the requirement posed by the isolation principle in 
Chap. 2. Temporal isolation requires the movement of the slow 
variables to be slow, and causal isolation calls for a neglegible impact 
of the fast variables x on the movement of the slow variables y, i.e. on 
9 (4 Y). 
5 In order to avoid mathematical pirouettes, we assume all regularity and integrability 
conditions which might be required to be satisfied. 
3.2.2 Comparative Statics 
In comparative statics, we restrict our attention to the partial system 
(3.2) and denote, hence, the fast variables as endogeneous and the slow 
variables as exogeneous. Write the partial model (2) as 
where the semicolon indicates that the variables which follow are taken 
as fixed parameters. 
Assume now that all solutions of (3.4) tend to a unique equilibrium 
T=T(y)  with f(X(y);y) = O  
i.e. 2 is stable '. 
If this equilibrium is approached rather quickly, we are entitled to 
approximate the true movement of the endogeneous variables by the 
movement of their equilibrium values X (y). We view the wanderings 
of the exogeneous (slow) variables as causes of the movement of the 
endogeneous (fast) variables, so to speak, and this can be achieved by 
studying the function a (y). 
This is the method of comparative statics, which can be described in 
the words of Keynes as follows: "The object of a model is to segregate 
the semi-permanent or relatively constant factors from those which are 
- - 
6 The concept of stability is used here and in the following in the sense of asymptotic 
stability for some region of attraction. The point (respectively set) f is asymptotically 
stable if for any solution x(t) of (3.4) starting in the region of attraction the following 
holds true: (a) x(t) -r R for r -, co; (b) any neighborhood U of f contains a 
neighborhood V of 2 such that x(t) E V implies x ( J )  E V for all r' z r. Refer to 
Bhatia/Szego for more mathematical details. 
To restrict the stability concept in such a way simplifies matters and offers the following 
advantage. Points which are stable but not asymptotically stable in the usual sense 
imply structural instability: Arbitrarily small changes in the system can change the 
qualitative behaviour of the solutions. This situation is clearly undesirable in economics, 
since economic models are never exact and the ceteris paribus clause will never be fully 
met. On the other hand, an asymptotically stable rest point implies (local) structural 
stability of the system (see Markus, theorems 1 and 4). 
It is to be stressed that the term "stability" is used with two different meanings in this 
book: Refemng to movements of variables, as in the present context, it pertains to 
movements of solutions of dynamical systems towards equilibrium; refemng to dara 
of the analysis, as in the foregoing chapter, it pertains to their constancy over time. 
I have decided to stick to this well-established, although ambiguous, usage of the term, 
rather than to introduce new notions, hoping that this will not lead to confusion. Note, 
however, that the term "structural stability", alluded to in Sect 3.4.1 below, refers to 
still another stability concept (see Markus). 
transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a logical way of thinking 
about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which they 
give rise in particular cases"'. Two additional remarks are in place 
here. Firstly it is not always necessary to start from' an explicit law of 
motion (3.2). In many cases we might conjecture that possible alterna- 
tive laws of motion in the partial system lead to the same equilibrium 
(3.5). If we have substantiated this conjecture, we are entitled to write 
down the equilibrium conditions (3.5) directly and start therefrom. As 
Malinvaud puts it: 
To rely . . . on a equilibrium formalization is to accept a short cut i.e. the consideration of 
those equilibrium states that would result from dynamic adjustments. . . . The result of the 
analysis then depends only on the definition chosen for equilibrium and not on the precise 
specification of the dynamic process that is supposed to lead towards this equilibrium. One 
does not need to inquire precisely into this process in order to draw conclusions; in other 
words, these conclusions are supposed to be "robust" with respect to the formulation of the 
process (Malinvaud p. 7). 
Secondly, the general idea developed here is not restricted to compar- 
ative statics in a narrow sense: Our partial model might generate cycles, 
for instance, and we might analyse their shape and position as 
determined by the values of the exogeneous variables. Hence a more 
comprehensive formalization of comparative static., covering also the 
case of multiple equilibria, reads as follows: Assume there exists for any 
y a compact (i.e. closed and bounded) set A(y) c Wm such that all 
solutions of the partial system (3.4) tend to A and all solutions starting 
close to A remain close to A forever. This set A (y) is named a stable 
attractor for system (3.4)8. If we want to stress that it is an-attractor 
with respect to a partial system, we will use the term partial attractor. 
This attractor might contain, e.g., rest points (multiple equilibria), 
periodic points (limit cycles), but also various motions. 
The comparative static method can be thought of as determining 
the correspondence A (y), i.e. the partial attractor as determined by the 
state of the exogenous variables, and also as studying the impact of the 
exogenous variables on its shape and position. Examples for this kind 
of procedure can be found in business cycle theory, for instance. In 
Sect. 3.4 we give some mathematical underpinnings for this idea. 
7 Keynes, (3) p. 296 f. 
8 See footnote 6 p. 30. 
3.2.3 The Moving Equilibrium Method9 
Assume we have analysed the partial model (3.4) and have determined 
a unique equilibrium, i.e. the function X ( y )  in (3.5).  The moving 
equilibrium method uses this result as a tool for simplifying the 
analysis of the complete model (3.2), (3.3) in the following manner: By 
assuming that a short run equilibrium always prevails, we can substi- 
tute x by X ( y )  in the equation y = g (x ,  y )  describing the movements of 
the slow variables. 
This substitution eliminates the fast variables and describes the 
movement of the slow variables as determined by their state alone: 
Instead of the true system of differential equations (3.2),  (3.3) we 
obtain the differential equation 
which describes the evolution of the variable Y serving as an approxi- 
mation for y. 
This kind of approximation seems to be sensible as long as the 
isolation principle holds true for the partial system, i.e. as long as the 
method of comparative statics makes sense. 
3.3 Extensions 
3 .3 .   he Marshallian Market 'O 
The moving equilibrium method can be illustrated by means of the 
following example. Consider a market with a demand z as a linear and 
decreasing function of price p: 
9 The moving equilibrium method has been used by Marshall most expediently. The 
mathematical treatment is due to Lotka (Chap. II). Samuelson, pp. 321 -323, has 
introduced it into formal economics It has been used widely in synergetics, recently. 
under the name "adiabatic elimination" (see H a k g  Chap. 7). The present exposition 
follows Schlicht (2). 
10 d. Marshall p. 288 n; Schneider pp. 302 - 3 12; Men (I) pp. 21 ff. 
It is assumed that supply y is fixed in the short run. Hence, for a given 
price p, a certain excess demand (z - y)  will result, and this leads to 
changes in price: If excess demand is positive, the price will increase; if 
negative, the price will decrease: 
- 
By using (3.7), this can be written as 
This is the equation describing the movement of price as a function of 
the prevailing price and current supply. 
Supply y will change over time, however, according to the price 
which can be obtained 
This can be interpreted in the following way. The expression (c  + d .  y)  
denotes the Marshallian "supply price", i.e. the price which would lead 
to a permanent and constant supplyaof y. If the prevailing price exceeds 
the supply price, supply increases; if it is lower than the supply price, 
supply decreases. The schedule p = c + dy is the long-run supply 
Schedule. Short-run supply is perfectly inelastic. 
The model (3.9), (3.10) can be treated by means of the moving 
equilibrium method if the speed of price adjustment 11 is much faster 
than the speed of supply adjustment p by taking price as the fast and 
supply as the slow variable. 
The equilibrium price P ( y )  for given supply is determined by 
putting (3.9) to zero 
P ( Y )  = ( a  - YW. 
Inserting this into (3.10) yields the moving equilibrium approximation 
equation for the slow variable 
Y = ~  { ( a / b -  c ) - (d - t  l / b )  Y ] .  (3.12) 
This differential equation has the general solution " 
I I An elementary introduction to differential equations can be found eg. in Allen (I )  
Chap. 5. 
Yo denotes the initial value of Y, Y denotes the equilibrium of (3.12) 
and C is the associated characteristic root: 
Since 6 < 0, the equilibrium is stable and the associated price is 
obtained by inserting Y into (3.1 1): 
p : = p ( F )  = ( c  + da)/(l + bd). 
The solution of (3.13) can be compared now with the true solution of 
system (3.9), (3.10). This system has the characteristic roots 
Since the radicand is less than (Ab + , ~ d ) ~ ,  both roots have negative 
real parts. Hence the stable equilibrium values are 
These are identical to those obtained by the moving equilibrium 
method. 
The stability properties of tl4e approximation turn out to be correct, 
too: it is stable. But consider more closely the dynamic behaviour of the 
moving equilibrium approximation as compared to the true movement. 
Assume that prices are moving sufficiently fast as compared to 
supply changes to guarantee 
which implies real roots 
In particular we obtain for A + co 
The general solution of (3.9), (3.10) can be written as 
y ( t )  = jj + c3 el1' + cq eGr 
where C I  , c2, c3, c4 are linear functions of (po - p)  and (yo - 7) with 
PO, yo as initial values. 
If 1 is large, eGt approaches zero very quickly and y approaches 
equilibrium with e-ll'. For large 1 we have [ z [I and the speed of 
adjustment obtained by the moving equilibrium method is approxi- 
mately correct. 
P 
Fig. 1 
In Fig. 1 the phase diagram of the true system (3.9,3.10) is drawn The 
curve marked by p = 0 is obtained from putting p in (3.9) equal to zero, 
which gives p = p  ( y )  = ( a  - y)/b. Above this curve, p is decreasing; 
below the curve, it is increasing. Similarly the y = 0 - locus is con- 
structed by setting equation (3.10) equal to zero. To the left of this curve 
y rises, at the right it declines. In the upper orthant the trajectories 
move to the south-east; in the right orthant, to the south-west; in the 
lower orthant to the north-west; and in the left orthant to the north-east. 
Furthermore we can look for those initial values (Po, yo) which lead 
to cz = cq = 0. These are on the locus A. It is the locus of those points 
where the speed of adjustment is determined solely by the first root C1. 
Similarly the locus B is obtained by putting cl and c3 equal to zero. On 
this locus it is the second root alone which describes the convergency 
towards equilibrium. 
The equilibrium is a stable node. The trajectories are osculating 
with locus A first at ,the high speed C2 and move close to this locus at 
the lower speed C l .  The larger 1, the more pronounced is the osculation 
with A. Furthermore it can be shown that A tends to the p = 0 - locus 
for 1 -, a, i.e. if price movements are very fast. The trajectories tend 
as straight lines towards A and continue along A to equilibrium 12. 
3.3.2 A Qualification 
The example might have illustrated the nature of the approximation 
obtained by the moving equilibrium method: It yielded the correct 
equilibrium and stability results. I would like to qualify the result, 
however, by pointing out that the speed of adjustment obtained by the 
moving equilibrium method is not necessarily the best approximation 
obtainable in the example. 
As long as the speed of price adjustment 1 remains finite, we have 
C 4 c l .  The speed of adjustment prevailing on the trajectory A, however, 
is exactly [I ,  and along this lochs the differential equation 
also holds true for the true system (3.9), (3.10): It gives the exact 
solution along A. On the other hand, the differential equation (3.9) 
implies 
P=C(Y--J) (3.22) 
which holds true for no trajectory at all. Since all solutions are tending 
towards A and continue close to A towards equilibrium, it seems more 
12 The proof can be sketched as follows Define z := @ - p ) / ( y  - 7 )  for y + j? From(3.9) 
and (3.10) we obtain i = - (b  . z + 1 )  - I (z2 - dz). A and B are defined by the 
condition i = 0 which leads to the corresponding two solutions z ,  and z2. This implies 
z ,  -r - b and zz + - co for 1 -r co. Consider now a linear transformation of the vector 
@, y) which transforms A into the abscissa and B into the ordinate. The transformed 
trajectories are given now by the family of functions ( = k I qJA'p generated by varying 
the parameter k. Hence the trajectories are approaching an angular shape for I -r cn 
(6. Enve p. 138). 
sensible to use the approximation (3.21) rather than the moving 
equilibrium approximation (3.22); intuitively it seems to be a better 
approximation in the sense that it describes the 'attracting trajectory A 
exactly. 
For 1 + co, tends towards and the approximations (3.21) and 
(3.22) coincide. As long as we are solely interested in qualitative results, 
however, we can still proceed to use the moving equilibrium method. 
That this holds true quite generally will be shown in the Sect. 3.4. 
3.3.3 A Ramification 
The moving equilibrium method can, in addition, be used iteratively: 
The vector Y can be partitioned again into "fast" and "slow" variables, 
and the moving equilibrium method can be used again to simplify the 
analysis of the moving equilibrium approximation (6) ,  and so forth. 
This leads to a procedure, envisaged by Marshall, of starting with short- 
run analysis and proceeding, step by step, to the analysis of longer 
periods. This has been described by Samuelson as follows: 
I, myself, find it convenient to visualize equilibrium processes of quite different speed, 
some very slow compared to others. Within each long run there is a shorter run, and 
within each shorter run there is a still shorter run, and so forth in an infinite regression. 
For analytic purposes it is often convenient to treat slow processes as data and concentrate 
upon the processes of interest. For example, in a short run study of the level of investment, 
income, and employment, it is often convenient to assume that the stock of capital is 
perfectly or sensibly fixed. 
Of course, the stock of capital from a longer run point of view is simply the 
cumulation of net investment, and. the reciprocal influence between capital and the other 
variables of the system is worthy of study for its own sake, both with respect to a hypo- 
thetical final equilibrium and the simple course of growth of the system over time. 
SO to speak, we are able by cereris paribus assumptions to disregard the changes in 
variables subject to motions much "slower" than the ones under consideration; this is 
nothing but the "perturbation" technique of classical mechanics. At the same time we are 
able to abstract from the behavior of processes much "faster" than the ones under 
consideration, either by the assumption that they are rapidly damped and can be 
supposed to have worked out their effects, or by inclusion of them in the dynamical 
equations (derivatives, differences, etc.) which determine the behaviour of the system out 
of equilibrium 
The first of the above mentioned alternatives constitutes the justification for the use 
for comparative statics rather than explicit dynamics. If one can be sure that the system is 
stable and strongly damped, there is not great harm in neglecting to analyze the exact path 
from one equilibrium to another, and in taking refuge in a mutaris mutandis assumption. 
Of wurse, if one chooses to neglect certain dynamic procases, one may still retain others; 
e.g. in studying capital formation over two decades I may choose to neglect inventory 
fluctuations, but still may retain the acceleration principle in its secular aspects 
Under the second alternative where shocther run processes are contained in (say) the 
differential equations of the system, it is to be understood that these differential equatiom 
do not necessarily hold exactly at each instant of time. There may well be a still shorter 
run theory which explains how still higher differential equatiw lead to (rapidly) 
damped approaches to the postulated differential equation relations. And so forth in 
endless regression (Samuelson pp. 330 ff.). 
This passage given an excellent characterization of the philosophy un- 
derlying the moving equilibrium method. 
3.3.4 Discontinuities 
Consider the partial system 
and take the slow variables as parameters in our further discussion. 
Now look at the partial attractor A (y). A possible shape is depicted 
in Fig. 2. For y close to zero, A @ )  contains only one stable rest point. If y 
increases, the moving equilibrium will move along the heavily drawn 
branch although between yl and y2 there is also a lower stable 
equilibrium on the lower heavily drawn branch of the graph. If y is 
increased beyond y2, however, the upper equilibrium vanishes and the 
moving equilibrium jumps to the lower branch of the graph and 
continues to move along that Manch if y is further increased. 
Fig. 2 
If the process is reversed, and y is decreased, the corresponding 
moving equilibrium follows the lower branch till yl and jumps to the 
upper branch if y is further decreased. 
Hence an analysis of moving equilibria might quite naturally lead 
to an understanding of discontinuous movements. The idea was 
developed by Kaldor in 1940 in the context of business cycle theory, 
and has been subjected recently to a refined mathematical treatment in 
catastrophe theory (see Thom). 
The argument is not restricted to the two-dimensional case, of 
course: These discontinuities will occur whenever the appropriate 
moving equilibrium moves discontinuously, and the moving equilib- 
rium method is an aid in understanding those qualitative differences in 
speed associated with regular movements along the graph and "cata- 
strophic" movements off the graph. 
Perhaps one could think that nakure works continuously since all 
developments proceed in finite time, but it is very fruitful to conceive 
the differences in speed between regular and catastrophic movements 
as qualitative differences, and it is not without irony that the moving 
equilibrium method, as developed by Marshall, offers a major theoret- 
ical tool for the study of discontinuities in spite of the fact that 
Marshall choose the motto: "Natura non facit sa1tum"for his book! 
3.4 Mathematical Aspects 
3.4.1 Approximation by Moving Equilibrium 
In this section we shall give some mathematical underpinnings for the 
idea of using the moving equilibrium method for simplifying the 
analysis of systems of differential equations. 
Consider the set of differential equations 
Equation (3.24) describes the movement of the fast variables, and 
Equation (3.25) describes the movement of the slow variables. The 
system (3.24), (3.25) is assumed to be a true system, and the system 
(3.26) describes the movement of the slow variables by the moving 
equilibrium approximation. 
In Equation (3.24) we have inserted a parameter a describing the 
speed of the fast process, and we will be interested in the question 
whether (3.26) gives a good approximation for the movement of the 
slow variables if a is suficiently high, i.e. if the fast variables are 
indeed sufficiently fast. 
Theorem. Assume the following: 
1. For any y E IRn there exists a compact set A ( y )  c JR" and a contin- 
uously differentiable function y, (x,  y )  such that 
y,(x,y)=O for x € A ( y ) .  (3.28) 
Hence p(x, y )  is a partial Ljapunov function. Its existence implies that 
the set A ( y )  is a globally asymptotically stable attractor for the partial 
system (3.24). All partial solutions tend to A ( y )  and remain in A ( y )  
forever. (See Sect. 3.2.2 regarding the notion of a partial attractor.) 
2. The functions g and G satisfy 
G ( y )  = g (x, y )  for all x E A ( y )  and all y.  
3. There exists a compact set B c lR" and a continuously differentiable 
function Q, such that 
Q , ( Y ) > O , Q , y G ( Y ) < O  for Y # B  
Q , ( Y ) = O  for Y E B .  
Hence Q, ( Y )  is a Ljapunov function for system (3.26) establishing that 
B is a globally asymptotically stable attractor for this system. 
There exists then for all sufficiently large a a globally stable compact 
attractor C,  of system (3.24), (3.25) which converges for a + a, to 
In other words: The attractor obtained by the moving equilibrium 
method (3.26) approximates an attractor of the true system (3.24), 
(3.25) for sufficiently large a. 
Proof: 
1.  First we prove 
p (x, y )  = 0 implies p, (x, y )  = 0 and py (x, y )  = 0. 
Denote by X I  the first component of (x, y )  and write 
h ( X I )  :=  XI ; X Z ,  . . . , x,, y1 , . . . , ym) for some given x2, . . . , x,, y. 
(3.34) 
Now consider an X I  with h(x1) = 0.' Since p is positive definite, h is 
positive 'definite. Hence h ( x l  + E )  2 0 and h ( X I  - c) a 0 for all E > 0. 
Since h is continuously differentiable and h ( X I )  = 0 we have 
h(x l+e )  h ( ~ 1 - E )  lim = lim 
e d O  & e-0 E 
and hence hl (x l )  = - h' ( X I )  which proves h' ( X I )  = 0 for h ( X I )  = 0. , 
This argument can be reiterated for all components of x and y, 
which proves the proposition. 
The same argument leads to 
@ ( Y) = 0 implies @, = 0. 
2. Define the set 
Since the functions involved in the definition are continuous, C, is 
closed. We prove 
C c C,. (3.38) 
To see this, take a (x, y )  E C. Since this implies p(x, y )  = 0 we have 
px = py = 0 by (33); since itimplies @J (y )  = 0, we have @, = 0 by (3.36). 
Hence the inequality in (3.37) is satisfied. 
3. Next we prove C, -, C for a + a. To see that, take any (x, y )  4 C. If 
q (x, y )  > 0, we have (x, y) 4 C, for sufficiently' large a. If q (x, y )  = 0, 
the two first terms in the definition (3.37) of Ca are equal to zero, and 
GQ = g ( x ,  y) holds true. Here (x, y )  4 C implies y 4 B and hence 
@, (y )  G ( y )  < 0 which violates the inequality in (3.37). 
4. Consider the function 
P ( X , Y )  + @ ( Y )  for ( x , ~ )  4 Ca 
for (x, y )  E C 
which the time derivative 
It is no~egat ive  and strictly positive outside Ca, and it is strictly 
decreasing outside of C,. Hence it is a Ljapunov function for C,. Fur- 
thermore C, is compact for sufficiently large a. Hence the set C, is 
globally asymptotically stable for sufficiently large a. This completes 
the proof. 
3.4.2 Additional Observations 
Corollary. If the true system (3.24), (3.25) is linear and both the partial 
system (3.24) and the movin4 equilibrium system (3.26) have unique 
stable equilibria Z ( y )  and F, the system (3.24), (3.25) has the unique 
stable equilibrium f (F), if a is sufficiently large 13. 
Proof: We have 
Obviously we have x = 0 for x = Z ( Q .  Furthermore x =  R ( F )  and 
y = implies for (3.42) 
Hence this is an equilibrium for the true system. 
. 
13 This theorem has been proved by another method in Schlicht (2). 
It is well-known that there exists for any stable A a positive definite 
matrix M satisfying l4 
AIM+MA=-I.  (3.45) 
(A is called stable iff all roots have negative real part., i.e. iff the partial 
system is stable.) 
Hence 
9 (x; Y) = (X - f (y))'M(x - f (Y)) 
is positive definite and 
is negative definite. Since p is continuous, all requirements for p in the 
Theorem are fulfilled. 
Furthermore there exists a positive definite matrix N satisfying 
provided the moving equilibrium system (3.43) is stable, and the 
associated Ljapunov function 
is positive definite with 
negative definite. 
Hence all requirements of the Theorem are met which proves 
stability of n(Y), F. Since this is a single point, it is also the smallest 
attractor of the true system. Hence the stable solution x = f(Y),  y =  Y 
of the true system is unique. 
Remark 1. In the linear case, the Jacobian 
14 Cf. Bellman pp. 243-245. 
describes the qualitative behaviour of the system (3.41), (3.42). Assume 
A to be nonsingular. Hence we can write 
and this implies that the eigenvalues of J are approximately the 
eigenvalues of aA and (D- CA-' B), respectively, if a is sufficiently 
large. Since (D - CA-' B) is the Jacobian of the moving equilibrium 
approximation (3.43), the method will yield correct qualitative conclu- 
sions, in general, if the system (3.41), (3.42) is structurally stable, i.e. if 
small changes in the system leave the qualitative behaviour of the 
system unchanged ". 
Remark 2. In the example of Sect. 3.3.1 ("The Marshallian Market") 
the moving equilibrium method leads to the correct equilibrium as well 
as to the correct stability conclusion independently of the speeds of 
adjustments. This is not, however, always the case. Consider e.g. the 
differential equation system 
with the associated moving equilibrium equation 
Here the partial system as well as the moving equilibrium system are 
stable and heavily damped, but the true system (3.51), (3.52) is 
unstable, its trace being positive. 
Remark 3. The Theorem requires continuously differentiable Ljapunov 
functions. This seems no severe restriction in view of the fact that 
stability implies in any case existence of continuous Ljapunov functions 
and is usually proved, in nonlinear applications, by means of Ljapunov 
functions which are typically piecewise continuous. This is, of course, 
I5 Lc if all eigenvalues have non-zero real parts in the linear case (see Markus 
Thwrem 4). 
sufficient for the purposes of Theorem 1 as long as continuous 
differentiability on the boundary of the attractors is assured. On the 
other hand, in the linear - or linearizable - case, the existence of 
continuously differentiable Ljapunov functions poses no problem, as 
has been demonstrated in the Corollary. 
Remark 4. Assume that the short-run system (3.24) produces a stable 
limit cycle with period T ( y ) .  Hence the average of x over the cycle is 
where x ( t ;  x, y )  denotes the solution of the partial system (3.24) for 
given y and the initial value x on the limit cycle. Similarly we might 
. . define 
as our moving equilibrium approximation. For u -, a, the speed of 
donvergence towards the limit cycle tends to be instantaneous and the 
period of the cycle tends to zero. Hence the movement of y will be 
approximated by (3.58) and the qualitative conclusions reached will be 
correct if the systems are structurally stable. 
3.5 Hicks-d'Alembert7s Principle 
Consider a falling stone. As long as it has not reached the ground, it can 
be viewed as being in disequilibrium. Its motion is governed, however, 
by the law that the force of gravitation equals the inertia opposing its 
acceleration. In this sense, it is in moving equilibrium while falling. 
This is called d'Alembert's Principle in mechanics, and it holds true 
quite generally: Any motion can be viewed as*balancing propelling and 
resisting forces - else the movement would be either faster or slower 
than it actually is. 
The same holds,true in economic& If there is no inertia, adjustment 
is instantaneous; if adjustment is not instantaneous, this can be attri- 
buted to adjustment costs, or searching costs, or other obstacles to 
instantaneous adjustment. 
Hicks seems to have been the first to make this point with regard to 
economic analysis. In Value and Capital he writes: 
So far as this limited sense of equilibrium is concerned it is true that we assume the 
economic system to be always in equilibrium. Nor is it unreasonable to do so. There is a 
sense in which current supplies and current demands are always equated in competitive 
conditions. Stocks may indeed be left in the shops unsold; but they are unsold because 
people prefer to take the chance of being able to sell them at a future date rather than cut 
prices in order to sell them now. .. . In this (analytically important) sense the economic 
system. . . can be taken to be always in equilibrium.. . l6 
Since Hicks first applied d'AlembertYs Principle to economics, we will 
refer to it as "Hicks-d'Alembert's Principle". 
This principle says that any state can be viewed as an equilibrium 
state by referring to suitable additional influences 17. Hence the notions of 
equilibrium and disequilibrium are theoretical notions in the sense that 
they always pertain to a particular theory which neglects those 
additional influences and that it is inadmissible to discern equilibria or 
disequilibria empirically, i.e. without reference to a particular theory. 
Furthermore the Hicks-d'Alembert7s principle elucidates the rela- 
tionship between statics and dynamics: All movements can be viewed as 
moving equilibria (although it is not necessary to do so), and in this 
sense, dynamics presupposes sdtics. On the other hand, static equilibria 
can be viewed as being generated by (infinitely fast) dynamical 
adjustments. In this sense, statics presupposes dynamics. Hence statics 
and dynamics are closely interlinked, and there is no gulf between 
them. 
16,Hicksp. 131. 
17 Note that the principle applies not only to the Marshallian but also to the Swedish 
equilibrium notion, even in the Hahn generalization (p. 28 n. above): If the ''theory" of 
an agent denotes the way in which he handles information or if a "policy" denotes the 
way in which the agent mcts to new information, his theory and policy will not be 
affected by new information. 
4. Econometric Implications 
. . . the element of Time, which is the centre 
of the chief difliculty of almost every economic 
problem. . . 
Alfred Marshall 
4.1 Linking Theory and Empirical Experience 
If economics is compelled to deal only with partial models which are 
changing over time and subject to unspecified and inexact ceteris 
paribus clauses, then its relation with empirical experience is somewhat 
vague. This haziness should not lead us to the extremist view that 
theoretical economics develops mere models of thought which cannot 
be confronted with empirical experience and empirical research re- 
quires one to ignore all complications arising from wandering ceteris 
paribus clauses and moving models. We shall attempt, rather, to 
explain that the view of economics expounded above is a good guide 
for devising statistical methods appropriate to our theoretical questions, 
thus interlinking theory and empirical evidence. The isolation principle 
offers a view which connects theoretical argumentes and empirical 
investigations, so we are not forced to view theory as merely devising 
arguments which can only be used for empirical investigations if 
stripped from their proper theoretical context The present chapter sets 
out to elucidate this link between theory and empirical evidence by 
means of examples, thus stressing the general point of view, rather than 
offering detailed solutions. 
4.2 Invariances in Coefficients Versus Invariances 
in Their Stability 
4.2.1 The Classical Invariance Premise 
Many economic models start with the. assumption that the coefficients 
describing the interaction of economic variables remain unchanged 
over time. This might be termed the classical invariance premise. 
Let us consider an example. Consider a consumption function 
relating aggregate consumption C to aggregate income Y. Economic 
theory writes simply 
and supposes that such a function is given for the period under analysis: 
It is valid ceteris paribus and satisfies the isolation principle. 
In order to determine the functions from real data, additional 
assumption have to be introduced. Usually one proceeds as follows '. It 
is assumed that the consumption function can be approximated linearly 
(or by some other analytic function - but let us stick to the simplest 
case): 
C = a + B Y  O < B < I ,  a>O. 
In order to interpret (4.2) empirically, C and Y must be dated. Let C, 
and Y, denote consumption and income in period t, respectively, and 
write 
This equation takes into account that the impact of income on 
consumption does not work instantaneously but rather is distributed 
over s periods. ; 
Since there are other influences on consumption which are fixed 
under a ceteris paribus clause in (4.1) but cannot be excluded in 
empirical applications, a random disturbance u, is added which is 
intended to capture these additional influences. In the simplest case it is 
assumed that u, is independently identically distributed with expecta- 
tion zero and variance a2: 
C I = a + ~ B t Y I - s + u I ;  E u ~ = O , E U ~ = $ , E U , U ~ = O  for t + t .  (4.4) 
r-0 
This is a typical econometric translation of the theoretical relationship 
(4.1). Given the time series of consumption and income, the parameters 
a, Po,. . . BS, o2 can be estimated, and this gives an empirical consump- 
tion function. 
See Schonfeld (1) pp. 2 ff. 
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The classical invariance premise is the assumption that the be- 
havioural coefficients a, Do, . . . Bs, which describe the interaction of the 
economic variables, are constant over time2. 'The impact of those 
factors covered by the ceteris paribus clause in (4.1) enters only through 
the disturbance tenn u, and its parameter 2. 
4.2.2 Economic Models as "Models of Thought" 
Keynes has criticized this assumption of time invariant economic coef- 
ficients in a very extreme manner: 
It seems to me that economics is a branch of logic, a way of thinking . . . (It) is a 
science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are 
relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this because, unlike the typical 
natural science, the material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homo- 
geneous through time. The object of a model is to segregate semi-permanent or relatively 
constant factors from those which are transitory or fluctuating so as to develop a logical 
way of thinking about the latter, and of understanding the time sequences to which they 
give rise in particular cases . . . . 
In chemistry and physics and in other n&ural sciences the object of experiment is to 
fill in the actual values of the various quantities and factors appearing in an equation or 
formula; and the work when done is once and for all. In economics this is not the case, and 
to convert a model into a quantitative formula is to destroy its usefulness as an in- 
strument of thought.. . . 
To do so would make it useless as a model. For as soon as this is done, the model 
loses its generality and its value as a mode of thought 
Hence, according to Keynes, a theoretical function like (4.1) is useful 
precisely because it is unspecified: 
Since we cannot reasonably' assume this function to be time 
invariant, there is no point in estimating it under that premise, but the 
function remains theoretically useful because we can deduce conclu- 
sions from it, such as the multiplier theorem, which are independent of 
its exact position. In theory we need not rely on the classical invariance 
premise, and presupposing it will lead to misleading results. 
If time dependent coefficients are explained by a function like a, = a + br, the classical 
invariance premise pertains to the parameters a and b. The classical invariance premise 
is also present in Bayesian models since the coeflicients, although seen as subjective 
random variables, are conceived of as being time invariant (see Schonfeld (2) 
C h a ~ .  13). 
~ e ~ ; e s  (3) pp. 296 ff., 299, 296. See also Keynes (3) pp. 285-332 and Keynes (1) 
pp. 44,297 ff. 
4.2.3. Short-Run Invariances 
Tinbergen's reply to Keynes' objection is simple and convincing: "Coef- 
ficients changing just by chance would, of course, render the whole of 
quantitative economic science imp~ssible"~. We cannot identify a law 
from real data which changes erratically over space and time, and it is 
preferable to avoid the term under these circumstances. But economics 
is, in fact, interested in laws exhibiting regularities and cornexions 
among similar but distinct events. Hence economics actually looks for 
invariances, but where? 
The isolation principle provides a hint here: Economic models are 
conceived in such a way that the data of the model are stable with 
regard to movements of the variables under study. Hence we are 
entitled to assume that the economic relations we want to describe are 
stable in the short run. On this, Keynes and Tinbergen agree. Keynes 
writes: ". . . it is only in a short series . . . that there is a reasonable ex- 
pectation that the coefficients will be fairly constant."' And Tinbergen 
says: "In most cases only small changes in structure will occur in the 
near f ~ t u r e . " ~  In fact, as long as we presuppose a model to be 
substantively isolated, it cannot be a mere "model of thought" with no 
empirical implications, since hypotheses about relative stabilities enter 
by necessity. 
But as to the implications, Tinbergen and Keynes part company. 
Whereas Tinbergen argues thai this stability in a short series renders it 
plausible to employ the classical invariance premise and use the 
assumption of constant coefficients as an approximation, Keynes 
correctly points out: "One of the chief dilemmas facing you is, of 
course, ... that the method requires not too short a series whereas it is 
ony in a short series, in most cases, that there is a reasonable expec- 
tation that the coefficients will be fairly constant" '. 
Hence, even if we take short-run invariances as an acceptable 
assumption, the issue remains: Is there any practicable alternative 
avoiding both Keynes' "modell of thought" nihilism and the short cut 
provided by the classical invariance premise? 
Note that the research programme of econometrics, which starts 
from the classical invariance premise, has not been particularly success- 
4 Keynes (3) p. 292 
5 Keynor (3) p. 294. 
6 Tinbergen p 152. 
7 Keynes (3) p. 294. 
ful up to now. Simple extrapolation methods perform quite often better 
in the sense of producing less misleading predictions '. 
As Hayek remarked, the problems with econometrics cannot be 
attributed simply to the fact that econometrics is a rather young dis- 
cipline: "Sir William Petty, the founder of Econometrics, was after all a 
somewhat senior colleague of Sir Isaac Newton in the Royal Society!"9 
As the criticism of econometrics put forward by economists like 
Keynes, Hayek, or Schumpeter is directed mainly against the classical 
invariance premise, it might be fruitful to look for an alternative lo. 
4.2.4 Invariances in Stabilities 
So let us look for an alternative to the classical invariance premise. We 
do not want to assume time-invariant coefficients. Rather we would 
like to have slowly but unpredictably varying coefficients. Hence we 
take the vector of coefficients of our model at time t as a random vector 
and denote it by a,. If a, is assumed to change slowly over time, the 
conditional density f (a, 1 a,- ,) will , concentrate close to a,- This 
amounts to the assumption of short-run stability, which is all we know 
from the isolation principle, and is certainly not enough for empirical 
analysis. We need additional strong assumptions. 
The assumption involved in the classical invariance principle, 
namely that a, = a,-, with probability one, is too strong, however, since 
it transforms short-run stability into long-run stability. This unwar- 
ranted implication can be avoided by relaxing it in assuming that the 
expectation of a, equals a , - I ,  and that a, is distributed around a,-I 
according to a certain time-invariant distribution. In other words, a, is 
assumed to be generated by a random walk 
involving the random variable u,  with Eu, = 0 and a certain time- 
invariant distribution. The size of the covariance matrix C:= Eut4  
measures the stability of the coefficients over time, and the classical 
8 See Bhattacharyya and the references cited therein. 
9 Hayek (3) p.437. 
10 It is interesting to note that Hayek and Schumpeter, while criticizing Keynes' macro- 
economics, are actually criticizing the classical invariancc premise: Their main point is 
always that time-invariant macmecmmmic relations cannot be postulated. See on this 
point Hayek (2) pp. 91 K, (3) p. 434, Schumpeter ( i )  pp. 91 ff., 473, 1 1  70- 1 184, (2). 
invariance premise is covered as the limiting case Z + 0. All this 
amounts to replacing the assumption of invariant coefficients by the 
assumption that the stability of the coefficients remains invariant over 
time. This stability invariance premise allows for both stability in the 
short run, as required by the isolation principle, and long-run instability 
of the coefficients at the same time, and is, hence, less vulnerable to the 
criticism raised against the classical invariance premise. 
One could argue, of course, along similar lines against the assump- 
tion of time-invariant stabilities, but note that some assumption of this 
sort is implicitly made by maintaining that any theoretical model 
remains true over time: This implies that the data of the model remain 
sufficiently stable. In view of the fact that we have to assume 
invariances somewhere, the stability invariance premise seems to me to 
suggest itself as the most appropriate hypothesis ". 
4.3 Estimation in a Linear Model 
with Random Walk Coefficients 
4.3.1 The Model I2 
1 
In the following a simple linear econometric model is analysed which 
differs from the classical linear regression model only in the assumption 
that the coefficients are generated by a simple random walk. The 
discussion is intended to demonstrate that the stability invariance 
premise might lead, at least in a standard case, to statistically treatable 
econometric models. It is, however, beyond my scope to go into various 
generalizations and complications. 
I 1  From a mathematical point of view it is not particuidy difficult to replace (4.5) by the 
generalization 
a,= Aa,-, + v ,  
but this requires additional information for determining the matrix A and runs into the 
problem that a, might lead to probabilistic stationary states for t -r m, whereas the 
process (4.5) is really dissipative and uninformative in the limit This seems to me to be 
more appropriate for economic models, which are not devised for giving a definite 
answer to problems in the indefinite future. 
12 See also Athans, CooleyfRescott, Pagan, and H a t a n W a n a k a  for analyses of related 
issues. 
Consider the regression model 
with y, E R, X I  E lRn observations, a, E Rn coefficients to be estimated, 
and u, E R normal disturbances for the time periods t = 1,2, . . . , T. The 
coefficients are assumed to be generated by a random walk with normal 
disturbances c, E lRn: 
The estimation problem can be discussed in two steps. First, the time 
path al , a2, . . . , a7 of the coefficients is estimated under the assumption 
that the variances a2 and .Z are known. The proposed procedure will be 
developed in Sects. 4.3.2-4.3.4 and amounts to minimizing the weighted 
sum of the squares of the disturbances u, and v,, i.e.I3 
Q =a-2 u : + , x  v;C-' v,. 
1- 1 .t-2 
In Sect. 4.3.5, the estimation problem for the variances is discussed 
under the simplifying assumption that the changes in the coefficients 
are uncorrelated; Sect. 4.3.6 gives some approximation results under the 
assumption that the coefficients are sufficiently stable over time, as 
required by the isolation principle. Under these assumptions, the 
estimation procedure boils down to elementary matrix operations with- 
out inversions or other complicated calculations. 
13 A straightforward way to estimate the time path a,, al ,  . . . , a= of the coefficients is to 
apply Kalman-Bucy filtering, and this has been the usual strategy. This way of dealing 
with the problem has severe shortcomings, however First and foremmt, Kalman filters 
are one-sided filters and are hence not optimal for the &mation of past coefficients, 
for which a two-sided filter ought to be used. Second, there exists no constant steady- 
state gain for updating the estimates, since the x,'s are time dependent. Hence the 
main computational advantage of Kalman-Bucy filtering is lost Third, the estimation 
of initial values poses problems in the Kalman framework. The aim of Sect. 4.3 is to 
hint at an alternative procedure for estimating the coefficients optimally in a oneshot 
procedure without having recourse to initial values. 
4.3.2 Notation 
Define 
order T x  1 T x  1 T n x l  ( T - 1 ) n x l  
order T x  T n  (T- 1 ) n x T n  
and write (4.6), (4.7) as 
Observations y, X and variances a2, C are assumed to be known and the 
problem is to estimate therefrom the timepath of the coefficients a. 
A descriptive approach wou!d be to minimize the sum of squares, 
i.e. 
Q = ~ - ~ U ~ U + V ' S ~ ' V .  (4.12) 
A necessary condition for a minimum is obtained by inserting (4.10) 
and (4.1 1 )  into (4.12) and putting the derivatives to zero 
A singularity problem will arise only for matrices X satisfying 
xi  c = xi  c = . . . = x i c  for some nonzero n x 1 vector c and can, hence, 
be ignored: The least-squares solution can be taken to be unique. 
4.3.3 A Parametrization 
Consider the set of the n orthogonal solutions z to Pz  = 0.  These give 
rise to an orthogonal matrix Z of order Tn x n with 
PZ=O,  Z'Z=Z, P t (pP ' ) - 'P+zz '=z .  (4.14) 
Any solution to (4.1 1) can be written as 
where I stands for a parameter vector. 
Inserting (4.15) into (4.10) gives rise to the regression 
y = X Z I + w ,  w : = x p ' ( p p ' ) - ' u + u  
. , 
(4.16) 
for the unknown parameters I. The disturbances w are normally distrib- 
uted: 
w N ( 0 , S )  S,:=XP'(PP')-'S,(PP')-'P~'+~~I 
The maximum likelihood (Aitken) estimate 1 satisfies 
z'x's,-' ( y  - X Z ~ )  = 0 
4.3.4 Estimating the Coefficients 
For given 5 y, X the system (4.15), (4.16) defines the distribution of a: 
~ - N ( z I  +BS;' ( y -  X Z ~ ) ,  Sa) ,  
B := P' (PP')-IS, ( P P ' ) ~ '  PX' 
So := P' (PP')-' S, (PP')-' - BS,  ' B' . (4.19) 
Hence a maximum likelihood estimate for a can be derived by taking 
the mode of (4.19) for any 1 satisfying (4.18): 
Theorem. If 1 satisfies (4.18), 8 from (4.20) will satisfy (4.23). Hence the 
minimization of the sum of squares (4.12) gives a maximum likelihood 
estimate for the coefficients a. 
Proof: Premultiplication of (4.20) by ( X ' X +  d P ' S ; '  P )  will result 
in X' y: 
Since PZ = 0,  the first term reduces to X ' X Z ~ .  Since XBS;' = I  
- a2 S;', the second term reduces to 
Using (4.14), the third term reduces to 
o2 ( I  - ZZ') X's,' ( y  - xz i )  . 
In view of (4.18) this reduces further to 
Hence X' y remains and all other terms cancel, Q.E.D. 
The accuracy of the estimate is described by the variance-covariance 
matrix S,. Note that S,, as defined in (4.19), is independent of 1. 
- 
4.3.5 Estimation of Variances 
In this section we shall make the following simplifying assumption 
Assumption. We assume that 
z= i":...02) 
0 0, 
is diagonal. 
From (4.16) and (4.17) we get the likelihood function 
For A = 1 and a = 6, the concentrated likelihood function can be 
derived: Define 
- 
Together with (4.16), (4.18), and (4.20) we get 
- 
and hence 
1 ", 6's;' +=?u S,d. 
'J 
(4.26) 
- 
Using the definition of S, and the relation X ' d  = a 2 ~ ' S ; ' B  from 
. , (4.13), (4.24), this reduces to 
Hence the second term in the concentrated likelihood function asso- 
ciated with (4.23) turns out to be the minimum of the sum of squares Q 
as defined in (4.12). Using (4.13), this can be written as 
1 Q = ~ ( ~ ' ~ - ~ ' X ( X ' X + ~ ~ P ' S ; ' P ) - ' X ' ~ )  
u 
(4.28) 
and the likelihood function to be maximized is 
From (4.28) we find 
aQ T 1 ..,A 
-=-- 
a~ 
,u u ;  -- 
1 2- -7CBi  - 
ad 'J dgi 'J i  1-2 
where f i i l  denotes the i-th component of GI. 
The matrix S, can be evaluated by defining the coefficients 
and the T x T matrix 
This permits us to write l4 
S,= a 2 1 +  H .  
Write furthermore 
where xi,  denotes the i-th component. of X I .  With these expressions we 
have 
d log det S ,  
= tr (a2 1 + H)-' da2 
d log det S ,  
= tr (a2 1 + H)-' Hi a af  
and we can determine the gradient of the concentrated likelihood 
function (4.29) 
and the maximum can be searched by a gradient process. 
4.3.6 An Approximation 
The dimensionality of the problem seems to be amazing. The matrix 
M : = ( X ' X +  a 2 P ' ~ ; '  P )  (4.40) 
14 For A as defined in (4.45) above, we have P = A O I. The r,, , are the elements of 
R := A1(M')-' (M')-I  A .  
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appearing in the normal equation (4.13) is, however, definite and of 
rather simple band structure: (4.41) 
M =  
2 z- 1 --z- 1 
Hence a numerical solution does not seem to be out of reach, especially 
if Z is diagonal. 
The estimation of the variances seems to be rather complicated, too. 
If the coefficients are sufficiently stable as suggested by the isolation 
principle, we can assume 02 % 05, for all i, and can use the approxi- 
mation . . 
'1 1 ( 0 2 ~ + ~ ) - ' z - - i Z - a H  (4.42) 
a o 
which will simplify the computation of (4.38) and (4.39) considerably. 
Under the assumptions 02 % of ,  'T large, we can approximate the 
normal equation in a similar fashion. By maximizing Q + v >  v 2  + v$vT 
rather than Q we obtain the normal equation 
with 
1 c:=, ((M)-' 8 z) 
- (4.44) 
where 
Hence the elements of (AX)-' are simply 
For a2 % 05, for all i, we can approximate 
(~+cx 'x ) - 'XI -CX 'X  
which implies 
a x C X ' y - C X ' X C X f y .  
For o2 % a3 we can also use the approximation (4.42) also in order to 
derive an approximation for the covariance matrix S, from (4.19), 
which describes the accuracy of our estimates. In view of (4.1 l ) ,  (4.17), 
and (4.34) we can write 
with R as given by (4.31), (4.33). 
Note that (4.48) and (4.49) can be computed by elementary matrix 
operations, and inversions are avoided. The same holds true for the 
gradients of the likelihood function (4.38), (4.39). Hence the dimen- 
sionality problem does not infringe on computability substantially. 
4.4 Unsettled Problems 
In the preceding chapters it has been argued that economic laws, since 
conceived ceteris paribus, shobld be viewed as changing over time. The 
estimation procedure which has been explained in the preceding section 
is intended to serve as an example illustrating to what kind of consider- 
ations the proposed view of economic laws might lead, and that 
workable estimation techniques can be devised along the lines indi- 
cated by the isolation principle. 
It is, however, an example dealing only with the simplest case, and 
many problems which have been tackled successfully in classical 
econometrics remain open here: Nothing has been said about the 
problems arising if the explanatory variables contain lagged endoge- 
neous variables, for instance, which would destroy the independence of 
the disturbances in (4.12) and would require an appropriate revision of 
the procedure. But these and similar problems are, in a sense, 
technicalities which are beyond my compass here. It is sufficient that 
the issue of developing appropriate estimation techniques for time- 
varying models be made clear. 
The nature of economic laws as described in Chaps. 2 and 3 suggest, 
however, two more general econometric consequences. 
The first observation is fairly straightforward: If coefficients are 
changing over time, there is no point in insisting'in asymptotic proper- 
ties (like consistency) of the estimators for coefficients. 
The second observation relates to the estimation of simultaneous 
equations systems. It is well-known that a proper estimation of a system 
of interdependent equations leads to different estimates for the coef- 
ficients of a certain equation than those obtained by estimating the 
equation in isolation. This is the "simultaneous equations bias". 
Similarly, the coefficients estimated for a given system might change if 
another equation is added to the system: Signs of the estimated 
coefficients might change, and even identifiability might be destroyed 
(Schonfeld (3)). 
This is a severe problem since economic models are always partial 
models, and it is hence always possible to add another equation, quite 
irrespective of how large the system is. ' 
Hence the simultaneous equations bias is not taken sufficiently 
seriously if it is used simply as an argument in favor of estimating 
systems of equations simultaneously rather than estimating single 
equations: Regardless of how large the system is, the bias will be 
present. 
What seems to be required, then, is a determination of the reliabil- 
ity of the estimates of a given system within the system, but without 
adding further equations. 
This seems to be possible, in principle, since the simultaneous 
equations bias can be attributed to correlations between explanatory 
variables and disturbances, and we might try to estimate those correla- 
tions directly within a given model, or argue that the simultaneous 
equations bias will not be too severe if our estimated residuals do not 
correlate too much with our explanatory ~ariables '~.  In a pioneering 
study, Pauly offered a first successful attempt to cover some simple 
cases in classical regression. It remains open, however, whether the 
method proposed in Sect. 4.3 lends itself to similar possibilities. 
15 See Goldberger pp. 288-294 for an interpretation of the simultaneous equations bias. 
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5. The Nature of Macroeconomic Laws 
Willst du dich am Ganzcn erquicken, 
So muBt du das Game im Kleinstcn erblickcn. 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
5.1 On Reductionism 
This chapter sets out to argue that there is nothing particularly dis- 
reputable in doing macroeconomic analysis even if no explicit micro- 
economic foundation is available. It will be argued, in fact, that 
macroewnomic laws might possess a certain degree of independence 
from their microewnomic underpinnings, and that analogies between 
microewnomic and macroeconomic laws might be misleading. 
I object, hence, to the widespread "reductionist" view that micro- 
economics is more fundamental t h n  macroewnomics. The reason 
given for that view is simply that the behaviour of aggregates is caused 
by individual decisions'. This is certainly true, in some sense, and 
&body will dispute it, but this is not the problem. 
The issue is not to assert some kind of irreconcilability between 
microeconomics and macroeconomics; an assertion which would, in 
fact, be incomprehensible to most (and to me). It is rather a possible 
difference in quality which we encounter, for instance, in yhermo- 
dynamics when the movement of molecules on the micro level manifests 
itself as heat on the macro level2. Another example is the interaction of 
our cells which leads to conscious utility maximization. Incidentally our 
shopping behaviour is a macrophenomenon in this sense, and a strict 
reductionist ought to start from neurophysiology or the zoo of particles 
rather than from utiity maximization for analysing it. But this does not 
seem to be a particularly sensible approach, and nobody seems to 
recommend it seriousIy. Rather it will be argued that certain stable 
relationships arise on the macro level of human conscience, perhaps for 
reasons of natural sefection and social conditioning, which lend them- 
selves to description by means of a stable utility function, rendering an 
explicit discussion of the underlying chaos redundant. An analogous 
1 Cf. Hahn p. 36, for instance. 
2 A similar example can be found in Becker. 
argument pertaining to the relationship between macroeconomic and 
microeconomic laws will be developed in this chapter. 
The main question to be dealt with is, of course, how macroeco- 
nomic laws emerge out of a given microeconomic structure. It will be 
argued that this can be analysed by a straightforward generalization of 
the isolating approach underlying the moving equilibrium method. 
This has various consequences regarding the stability of macroeco- 
nomic laws, their interdependence, and their shape. In all this, macro- 
economic laws might differ from their microeconomic counterparts. 
5.2 The Macroeconomic Method 
5.2.1 Macroeconomics as an Isolating Approach 
Macroeconomics deals with relationships between economic aggregates 
such as national product, employment, inflation etc. without taking 
explicit recourse to the underlying microeconomic variables like the 
income and employment situation of the individual households, and 
the movement of the various prices, etc. The implicit assumption of this 
procedure is obviously that these aggregate relationships exist and are 
sufficiently stable. But what is involved in this assumption? One 
reading would be to say that it is not necessary to take microeconomic 
variables into explicit consideration because there are microeconomic 
influences which enforce a certain microeconomic structure for each 
particular macroeconomic state. This underlies Keynes' analysis when 
he writes ". . . we assume that a given volume of effective demand has a 
particular distribution of this demand between different products 
uniquely associated with itw3. Another way of putting it is to say that 
macroeconomics presupposes that structural effects are negligible. 
In the language of Chap. 2 we can rephrase this argument by saying 
that macroeconomic relationships can be isolated from microeconomic 
events: We can take the microeconomic processes enforcing definite 
microeconomic structures for any given macroeconomic state as data of 
our analysis, and can f ix them under a.ceteris paribus clause. Seen in 
this way, macroeconomic analysis is simply a particular way of using 
the isolating approach. . 
3 Keynes (1) p. 43 a. 
There is another reading of macroeconomics, of course, which 
considers macroeconomic models as hypothetical ones which aim at 
developing certain ideas and mechanisms which are to be incorporated 
into more elaborate microeconomic structures later o n 4  This view - 
viewing macroeconomics models as generated by hypothetical isola- 
tions, as parables - seems to pose no theoretical problem, and hence we 
will not be concerned with it in the following. The theoretical problem 
arises if we ask ourselves what might be the substantive content of 
macroeconomic models which lack explicit microeconomic underpin- 
nings. The issue is substantive isolation. 
5.2.2 The Aggregation Principle 
This and the following two sections describe the general nature of the 
relationship between microeconomic and macroeconomic laws, provid- 
ing a starting point for our later discussions. Consider a microeconomic 
system. Denote the microeconomic state by the real vector x and its 
change over time by f .  The micro&onomic system (S) is identified 
with its law of motionS 
This system (S) is assumed to describe the microeconomic process 
truly, it is the true system. 
Consider now an aggregation rule (A) which associates to each 
microeconomic state x a certain vector X of aggregate variables. It is 
assumed that the macro state X involves less components than the micro 
state x: 
X=a(x) ,  x € R m ,  X E R " ,  n < m  (A) 
The change of the macro state over time, denoted by X, is conceived as 
a function of the macro state alone, i.e. 
This is the macroeconomic system (M). 
4 Fisher p. 575, Schlicht (1) pp. 52 ff. 
5 For the sake of simplicity I refrain from more general formalizations here and assume, 
furthermore, that all differentiability and regularity conditions implicitly required by 
the arguments which follow are satisfied. 
Assume that all this is given - a microeconomic system (S), an 
aggregation rule (A), and a macroeconomic system (M). In which sense 
can we expect the macroeconomic system (M) to describe the move- 
ments of the true microeconomic system correctly? This is the SAM 
problem. 
A correct description would require that the true movement of the 
micro state leads, upon aggregation, to the same movement of the 
macro state as the macro system, i.e. 
This is certainly not achievable, in general, for all x E IRm 6.  We might 
restrict our argument, however, to the set where this condition is 
fulfilled. 
X:= {xIF(a(x)) =a,(x) - f(x)} 
This is the aggregation set, i.e. the set of microeconomic states where 
the aggregate system holds true exactly. If we can give arguments 
assuring that all solutions of the microeconomic model approach this 
aggregation set very quickly (implying this set to be nonempty), we are 
justified in restricting our attention to the macroeconomic model: We 
can be sure that the microeconomic state is within the aggregation set 
already and that the macroeconomic model will give a good description 
of the movement of the macroe&onomic aggregates. 
This can be summarized in the following aggregation principle: A 
necessary condition for a macroeconomic model being substantively 
isolated from its microeconomic underpinnings is that the solutions to the 
microeconomic system approach the aggregation set sufficiently fmt. 
It is to be noted here that the macro system is only "valid" on the 
macro image of the aggregation set, i.e. on r (Z ) .  Hence we have to 
restrict the domain of the macro model to a (L) n Rn. 
It is to be noted here that the aggregation principle states a 
requirement which is to be satisfied if a given macro model is to be 
substantively isolated. This does not at all exclude that alternative 
macro models - even different macro models based on the same 
aggregation rule - satisfy this principle. 
6 Take e.g. linear functions f (x) =Ax, a(x) = Ex, F(X) = CX with constant matrices of 
appropriate order. Condition (1) would imply CB = BA which cannot be achieved, in 
general, and it is not possible in general either to find for given A and B a matrix C 
which satisfies this condition. (See Schlicht (6) however.) 
Consider for instance the case of two macro models F' and F2 with 
aggregation sets C1 2 C2. If F2 satisfies the aggregation principle, F' 
will satisfy the aggregation principle, too, since all states approaching 
C2 sufficiently fast will approach 21 a fortiori. We might argue, of 
course, that F' is a better model because the associated aggregation set 
is larger. This argument is the same as that in Sect 3.3.4 where it was 
also argued that the moving equilibrium approximation of the Mar- 
shallian market is not necessarily the best method. But the appro- 
priateness of a macro model is not simply a matter of the size of the 
aggregation set. Rather the model is to be chosen such that the 
solutions enter the aggregation set as early as possible and remain 
therein. This has been the reason for choosing in Sect. 3.3.2 the slowest 
trajectory A (Fig. 1 p. 35) as the aggregation set rather than some other 
trajectory such as B. (Note that A and B cannot be compared by size 
easily.) We shall come back to altemative aggregation procedures in 
Sect 5.4.4. 
5.2.3 Aggregation and Moving ~quilibrium 
Consider the microeconomic system 
and an aggregation rule 
Introduce now additional variables Y and an additional aggregation 
rule 8: Rm -, IZk, k z rn - n such that there is a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between the vectors (X, Y) and x. Write 
and call it the augmented aggregation rule. Since a' is assumed to be 
bijective, the true system (5.3) implies the equivalent system 
x=G(X, Y) G:=aX(K1(X, Y))-f(K1(X, Y)), (5.6) 
If the movement of the auxiliary variables Y is sufficiently fast, the 
system (5.6), (5.7) can be analysed by the moving equilibrium technique 
along the 'lines indicated in Chap. 2. This is precisely the view of 
aggregation adopted here: Convergency towards the aggregation set 
.Z := (x 1 H (a (x), B (x)) = 0) is assumed to be sufficiently pronounced. 
Hence it turns out, in fact, that aggregative analysis is simply a variant 
of the isolating approach underlying the moving equilibrium method. 
Seen the other way round, the moving equilibrium method is 
simply a special case in aggregation. The variables x (fast) and y (slow) 
are transformed by means of the aggregation rule Y = a (x, y) and the 
auxiliary variables are the fast variables x in the "direct" moving 
equilibrium case. The basic feature is still that a system of higher 
dimensions is described in lower dimensions. This, however, is the 
essence of aggregation. 
5.2.4 The Macroeconomic Isolation Principle 
The aggregation principle - that the solutions of the true system are 
almost always close to the aggregation set - states a necessary but by no 
means sufficient condition for a macroeconomic model to be substan- 
tively isolated from its microeconomic underpinnings. We have to 
consider, in addition, the problems of causal and temporal isolation. 
These are slightly more intricate. 
Let us start with an example. Consider the statement: "If national 
income rises by I%, consumption demand will increase ceterius paribus 
by 0.7%". The ceteris paribus clause refers here to a constancy of 
consumption behaviour, obviously, but also to the constancy of prices 
or to a definite reaction of consumer prices to a change in consumer 
demand, for instance, and to a definite distribution of the additional 
income among consumers. It is obvious that a given increase in national 
income might lead to quite different increases in consumption demand 
according to how it is distributed. (Only if all consumers have the same 
marginal propensity to consume will the demand increase remain 
unaffected by the distribution of income, but this is obviously a rather 
uninteresting case.) 
Hence the ceteris paribus clause underlying our macroeconomic 
consumption function implies a definite association between the level 
of national income and its distribution. This would be purely hypo- 
thetical if we could not give reasons for this assumption! But this is not 
very difficult: It is sufficient to postulate that the true system (S) 
produces a definite income distribution and hence a definite association 
between national income and consumption demand. This can be done 
without knowing the true system (S) in detail, but it implies that the 
true system remains constant: The ceteris paribus clause entails not only 
the constancy of individual consumption behaviour, but also the 
constancy of the true system (S), since this system as a whole deter- 
mines the distribution of income. Microeconomic production functions 
fall under the ceteris paribus clause, for instance, because they affect 
factor demand, factor prices and, hence, the distribution of income. 
Generalizing we can say that a ceteris paribus clause, if employed in 
macroeconomic analysis, fixes the underlying microeconomic system. If 
we aim for substantive isolation, we have to consider whether this is a 
good approximation. In order to do that, we have to consider the 
impact of changes in the microeconomic system on the macroeconomic 
laws. 
Denote by F m  the set of continuously differentiable functions 
Rm -, lRm which contain the possible candidates for microeconomic 
systems and denote by P: F m  -, F n  an aggregation procedure which 
associates a macroeconomic system :F E F n  to each microeconomic 
system f E Fm 
F =  P(f) ,  f E Fm, F € F n .  (PI 
The aggregation procedure (P) replaces the macroeconomic system in 
the SAM problem: We have a SAP problem (microeconomic system 
(S), aggregation rule (A), and aggregation procedure (P)). 
Changes in the microeconomic system over time (due to changes in 
tastes and technology, for instance) will induce changes in the macro- 
economic system according to (P). The conclusions drawn from a 
macroeconomic analysis under the assumption of a fixed microeco- 
nomic system will remain valid in an approximate sense, however, if 
the microeconomic solutions approach the aggregation set quickly, and 
if the aggregation set actually does not move too quickly: The 
movement of the aggregation set, as induced by changes in the micro- 
economic system, ought to be slow compared to the speed with which 
the microeconomic solutions approach the aggregation set in order not 
to supersede or destroy the conclusions drawn from the macroeconomic 
model. This amounts to what can be termed macroeconomic temporal 
isolation. Furthermore, causal isolation of the underlying microeco- 
nomic model requires that its data remain sufficiently unaffected by 
changes in its variables. This translates, in the macroeconomic context, 
into the requirement that the macroeconomic data (i-e. the shape of the 
various macro functions) remain sufficiently unaffected by movements 
in the macro variables. This amounts to what can be termed macroeco- 
nomic causal isolation. 
A case where this requirement is violated is given by Keynes when 
he writes: 
The fault of the classical theory lies, not in limiting its terrain by assuming constant 
income, but in failing to see that, if either of its own variables (namely the propensity to 
save and the schedule of marginal efficiency of capital) change, income must ceteris 
paribus change; so that its tool breaks in its hand and it doesn't know and can't tell us 
what will happen to the rate of interest, when either of its own variables changes (Keynes 
(21, P. 559). 
Hence in order that a macroeconomic theory be substantively isolated 
it is to be required that 
1. The aggregation principle is satisfied; i.e. that all solutions of the 
underlying microeconomic model tend to the aggregation set suffi- 
ciently fast. 
2. The macroeconomic temporal isolation principle is satisfied; i,e. 
that the movement of the aggregation set caused by changes in the 
underlying microeconomic system is sufficiently slow. 
3. The macroeconomic causal isolation principle is satisfied; i.e. that 
the macroeconomic data remain sufficiently unaffected by the macro- 
economic variables. 
If these requirements are satisfied we say that the macroeconomic 
isolation principle is satisfied. 
This formulation might seem to be much too demanding since it 
might suffice to say that the conclusions drawn from the macroeco- 
nomic model ought to be correct, and all deviations not affecting these 
conclusions ought to be permitted. This argument appears misleading 
however, since it leaves scope for correct conclusions drawn from wrong 
premises, and we shall stick to the view that a theory can be wrong even 
though it gives correct predictions. Hence the above, somewhat more 
elaborate, characterization has been chosen. 
5.3 Closed Aggregation and the Context Dependency 
of Economic Laws 
5.3.1 Closed Versus Open Aggregation: 
A Comparison in Statics 
The usual view of the aggregation problem differs substantially from 
what has been said here, and the following is intended to put this 
difference into perspective. 
The view of aggregation developed here will be called closed 
aggregation because it refers to a complete system which might be 
partial but is closed in the sense that the system determines the 
behaviour of all its endogeneous variibles. Much of the aggregation 
literature is, in contrast, concerned with the problem of open aggrega- 
tion, which is concerned with aggregating a subset of microeconomic 
relationships. These constitute an open system, typically, since the 
remaining equations which close the microeconomic model are not taken 
into consideration. 
The distinction between open and closed aggregation (although not 
under these particular labels) is present already at the roots of the 
formal aggregation literature: The classic papers by Klein (1946) and 
May (1947) elaborate on this very issue: Klein favors open aggregation, 
and May argues in favor of closed aggregation. The economics 
profession as a class has preferred the Klein position and seems to have 
discarded May's arguments! I 
This appears to m e  to have been an unsound choice, and I shall try 
to explain by contr&ng these two views in static analysis. Such an 
analysis allows for a modern reformulation of May's view, which will 
be seen to be just a special case of the view of aggregation presented in 
the foregoing sections. 
7 One can only guess why this has been so. Perhaps the main reason is that May's 
procedure is mathematically trivial in the static context and offers no particular 
problems, whereas Klein's program posed a lot of challenging mathematical questions 
which turned out only later on to be answerable in the negative (though May had 
anticipated these problems). One should not forget to mention the contributions by 
Dresch, Pu, and May (1) as important forerunners of May's (2) seminal work and as a 
starting point for Kicin's (1) most influential contribution. 
We turn our dynamic models (S) and (M) into static models by 
setting the time derivatives to zero. Hence 
denotes our microeconomic equilibrium model, and 
is the static macro model. The aggregation rule 
X =  a ( x )  (A) 
remains. 
Closed Aggregation. Consider the set of microeconomic equilibria 
and the set of macroeconomic equilibria 
The aggregation problem is solved if the macro model and the aggrega- 
tion rule are selected such that 
: 
i.e. the aggregation of microeconomic equilibria gives the set of 
macroeconomic equilibria8. In the terminology of the foregoing section, 
the set of microeconomic equilibria is required to be contained in the 
aggregation set. 
Condition (5.10) is not, in fact, very demanding. If the macro 
equilibrium is unique, for instance, a (Gf) contains one point 2 only 
(the macro equilibrium), and there are many macro systems F leading 
to the same equilibrium e.g. 
8 a (G,) := {a (x )  1 x E G,}. 
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where the index i refers to the i-th macro variable and q denotes the 
Euclidean distance. For the case that a (Gf) contains multiple equilibria, 
similar constructions can be made '. 
Hence the static problem of closed aggregation is 6ssentially trivial, 
and many alternative macroeconomic systems F E F n  will exist which 
have the same equilibrium set''. There thus remains much freedom 
concerning the appropriate choice of a macroeconomic system, and 
additional requirements could be introduced. Our foregoing discussion 
suggests that the macroeconomic model ought to be selected in such a 
way that its dynamic behaviour approximates the true microeconomic 
dynamics as closely as possible ' I .  
Open aggregation. Open aggregation is concerned with a different 
problem, which can best be illustrated and criticized by means of an 
example. 
Consider n microeconomic consuplption functions ci= Y ( y i ) ,  i = 
1,2, . . . , n, which give the consumption expenditure ci of individual i as 
determined by its income yi. The aggregation problem is to find a 
macroeconomic consumption function C =  Y ( Y )  relating aggregate 
consumption C =  Cci to aggregate income Y := C y i .  Hence the micro- 
economic variables are c = ( c l ,  ..., &) and y = ( y l ,  ..., y,) and the 
aggregation rule is 
The microeconomic system is 
9 E.g. F1 (X)= e [X. e(Gf)J 
Fi(X)=O for i = 2 ,  ..., n. 
This is not necessarily continuously differentiable, but might serve to illustrate the 
point. mote that a (G,) is closed iff and a are continuous] 
10 If M is any nonsinguiar n x n-matrix and F is a macroeconomic system satisfying 
(5.10), the system F' := MF will do the same, for instance. 
11 As an additional advantage we might use Samuelson's "correspondence principle" if 
the macroeconomic model is chosen according to this criterion (cf. Samnelsorr. 
Chap. 9). An alternative point of view can be found in IQein (1) p. 93 who argues that 
the macroeconomic system ought to be chosen in such a way that it is analoguous to 
the underlying microeconomic system - he requires, for instance, that a marginal 
productivity theory ought to hold true for the m a ~ f ~ e ~ ~ n o m i c  system. If the macroecu 
nornic system is selected in this way, however the use of the correspondence principle- 
might be misleading. Still another way to select a macroeconomic model is to aim at 
reducing context dependency (see Sect. 5.4.4). 
and the required macroeconomic system is 
Hence the problem is to find a function Y such that 
yi (y i )  = y ( C  yi) (5.15) 
for all y E R:. Obviously this is possible if and only if the microeco- 
nomic consumption functions have the following special form 
for all i and certain constants (a1 . .. a,) and b, i.e. if all consumers have 
the same marginal propensity to consume. Hence open aggregation 
requires severe restrictions on the microeconomic functions, and similar 
severe "aggregation conditions" arise quite generally by attempts to 
replace several micro functions by a single macro function. Hence the 
view of open aggregation implies microeconomic restrictions which 
render aggregation impossible in almost all relevant cases; there seems 
to be consensus about this point 12. 
This difficulty with open aggregation is not surprising if one looks 
at problem (5.12) - (5.15) from the point of view of closed aggregation. 
The microeconomic equilibrium set is 
; 
G ,  := {(c, Y )  E R:" 1 c = y /  ( y ) }  (5.1 7 )  
and the problem is simply to find a function 8 (C, Y) with the implied 
macroeconomic equilibrium set a(G,)I3. As has been argued above 
(p. 72) this poses no difficulties 14. 
This function would contain all information on the macroeconomic 
equilibria obtainable from the microeconomic system (5.13), and 
nothing more can be expected. On the other hand, this characterization 
of possible macroeconomic equilibria does not give very much infor- 
mation, in general, since the equilibrium set a (G,) might be very large. 
If there exists, for instance, one household with a zero marginal 
propensity to consume and another household with a marginal propen- 
12 See Nataf (2) p 164 or Fisher p. 563, for instance. Klein's position is somewhat 
different and will be discussed in Sect 5.5.2. 
13 The aggregation rule a is given by (5.12). 
14 8(C, Y) := p((C, Y), a(G,)) would do, for instance. 
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sity to consume of unity, the macroeconomic equilibrium set would be 
the entire area below the 45" line in the Y - C diagram. Closed aggre- 
gation requires, therefore, a functional relationship C = Y(Y) between 
the macroeconomic variables. The crucial point is, however, that such a 
functional relationship cannot be deduced from the microeconomic 
system (5.13) under reasonable conditions. It could be obtained by 
restricting the set of admissible income distributions. But this is 
precisely the point of view of closed aggregation: We take (5.33) as 
embedded into a larger microeconomic system which determines 
certain possible income distributions. This context restricts the set of 
macroeconomic equilibria and gives rise to meaningful macroeconomic 
relations Is. Demanding (5.15) to hold true for all income distributions 
y E R: renders the aggregation problem sterile. This demand is exces- 
sive, however, since all we need to require is that (5.15) hold true for 
those income distributions which actually occur rather than for all 
income distributions y E R:'6. This amounts to discarding open aggre- 
gation and adopting the point of view of closed aggregation. 
A more general formulation of the preceding straightforward: Take 
one group of equations of the microeconomic system (SE), say the first 
k equations, write the system in partitioned form as 
and partition the macro system similarly: 
The aggregation rule remains 
The partial macro systems F', F2 are taken to subsume the partial 
micro systems f' and f 2, respectively. 
15 This point of view is underlying the well-known Hicks-Leontief aggregation which 
presupposes constant relative prices within the aggregates in order to fix their structure 
(see Leontief ( I ) .  Hicks pp. 33 ff., Samuelson pp. 143 ff.). 
16 Pu has stressed this point in detail in his criticism of Klein's views on aggregation. 
Open aggregation is concerned with the partial systems 
alone while "forgetting" about the remaining systems f2 and F ~ .  The 
corresponding equilibrium sets are 
(The superscript o refers to open aggregation.) If the construction of F' 
uses only the information contained in f  ', nothing more than 
can be obtained. Since E$ might be very large, this will often be of 
limited use only. 
From the point of view of closed aggregation, the remaining parts 
of the systems are taken explicitly into account. Define the equilibrium 
set belonging to f 
Ep:= {x E ~ ' " 1  f2(x) = 0) .  (5.25) 
, 
Since only equilibria in this set will be realized, we can replace (5.24) 
by the condition 
E p  = a (Gf1 n Gp) (5.26) 
which implies a smaller equilibrium set and hence a more informative 
partial macro system. 
The aggregation condition (5.10) reads now 
EF:= Epn  Ep= a(Ef tn  Ep) (5.27) 
with 
Ep:= ( X  E RnI F ~ ( x )  = 0) (5.28) 
in the case of closed aggregation. 
Compare this with the corresponding conditions for open aggrega- 
tion 
E+ = a (Efl) . (5.29) 
and look at the resulting macroeconomic equilibrium set 
This leads to the following theorem. 
Theorem 
1. The set of macroeconomic equilibria EF obtained under closed 
aggregation is a subset of the macroeconomic equilibrium set E f  
obtained under open aggregation, i.e. 
2. On the other hand, open aggregation might lead to macroeconomic 
equilibria with no corresponding microeconomic equilibrium, i.e. 
EF B f  
might occur. 
Prbof: Relation (5.32) will be proved first. For any X E EF there exists 
x E G p  n Gp such that X = a (x) .  Hence X E Ej1 and X E E$a. That 
(5.33) might come to be can be shown by means of an example. Take 
m = 4, n = 2 and the microeconomic system 
This system has the unique equilibrium x = 0. Take the aggregation 
rule 
x ' = x ~ + x ~ ,  x 2 = x 3 + x a .  (5.36) 
Hence the macroeconomic equilibrium set obtained under closed 
aggregation contains only one point: 
On the other hand, we have the equilibrium sets 
implying 
E$= (X E lR21 = 0) 
Hence the macroeconomic equilibrium set obtained under open aggre- 
gation is 
E $ = { X E  W ~ I X ~ = O )  
which contains many points with x2 + 0. These cannot be microeco- 
nomic equilibria, Q.E.D. 
The basic criticism of open aggregation is contained in part 2 of the 
Theorem: Open aggregation might lead to wrong results. 
5.3.2 The Context Dependency of Economic Relations 
In comparing closed and open aggregation it turns out that under closed 
aggregation the macro relations F' depend on the whole microeco- 
nomic system, i.e. not only on f 1  but also on f2 .  Furthermore, the 
partial macro system F' cannot be chosen independently of the 
remaining macro part F2 if we require the aggregation condition (5.27) 
to hold true - as we should do. This feature - that a macro relation 
depends on the whole underlying micro system as well as on the 
remaining part of the macro system - can be referred to as context 
dependency. 
This context dependency of macro relations is to be expected under 
closed aggregation whereas it is absent, by construction, in open 
aggregation. This problem was discussed at the very beginnings of the 
aggregation debate: Klein tried to avoid it, which led him to open 
aggregation; May, on the other hand, argued that we have to put up 
with it since it is impossible to derive meaningful macro relations, in 
general, if we insist upon context independency ". I have argued in the 
foregoing in favour of May's view, and the utterly restrictive results of 
aggregation theory following Klein seem to witness the same '*. - 
Hence, when talking in the following about macroeconomic rela- 
tions, we will adopt the closed view and take into account that the 
relations involved might be context dependent. This does not imply, 
however, that context dependency is warranted, and we might still feel 
inclined to minimize it, in sympathy with Klein. Context dependency 
will simply turn out to be unavoidable in many cases, and instead of 
pretending it is not there, we will try to reduce it 19. 
5.4 On Qualitative Differences Between Microewnomic 
and Macroeconomic Laws 
5.4. Three Differences 
At this point of the discussion it might be appropriate to pause and 
dwell a little on the qualitative relationship between microeconomic 
and macroeconomic laws from another point of view: Macroeconomic 
laws will not, in general, be simple analogues to the corresponding 
microeconomic relations. Their shape might be quite different, and 
simple analogies between microeconomic and macroeconomic relations 
(so often encountered in political arguments) might be quite misleading. 
17 Klein (2) p. 309; May (2) p. 63. By the way, Keynes referred to context dependency 
when writing: "... an increase in effective demand due to an increased marginal 
propensity to consume might find itself faced by a different aggregate supply fundion 
from that which would face an equal increase in demand due to an increased induce 
ment to invest" (Keynes (1) p. 43 n). 
18 See Nataf (I) and Leontief (2), for instance. 
19 By the way, the question of context dependency has some philosophical implications 
regarding the juxtaposition of the doctrines of "internal" and "external" relations in 
Russell, pp. 42-50. Internal relations are context dependent, external relations are not 
If we argue - as in Sects. 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 below - that all relations can be viewed as 
macro because any system can be thought of as being produced by an underlying 
micro system, and if aggregation is bound to be closed, all relations ought to be 
expected to be context dependent, in principle. This amtradicts Russell's view, which 
he considers as being of nearly logics! necessity, that relations ought to be conceived of 
as external, and it vindicates the old dialectical view that each part of a system 
"contains" the whole of the system. 
Even if a particular macroeconomic relation is simply a certain 
average of some microeconomic relations, it might look different 
because averaging involves some lund of smoothing. Furthermore, 
averaging might lead to an elimination of certain variables which are of 
microeconomic importance but then cease to be of macroeconomic 
importance. A similar elimination effect might occur in other ways, as 
we shall see later on. Furthermore, closed aggregation might lead to 
macroeconomic laws which have no qualitative counterpart in any of 
the underlying microeconomic relations, they might appear quite 
different. This is due to what might be denoted the system effect. 
These three effects - the smoothing effect, the elimination effect, 
and the system effect - are closely interlinked, of course. For 
expositional reasons we will proceed to discuss them separately, 
however, offering brief characterizations and a few examples. These 
might serve to further illustrate the view on aggregation expounded 
here. 
5.4.2 The Smoothing Effect 
1 .  General Characterization. Putting microeconomic relations together 
in order to obtain a macro~conomic relation might smooth out 
microeconomic discontinuities. Consider the following examples. 
2. Microeconomic Fixed Proportions and Macroeconomic Variable Pro- 
portion.?'. Take a certain number of firms. Each of them has a pro- 
duction function 
y=min{a .k ,  b - n }  (5.43) 
relating output y to the inputs of capital k and labor n. The productivi- 
ties a and b are distributed among firms according to the "generalized 
Pareto distribution" 
20 This idea is from Houthakkw, see also Johamen. AUen (2) pp. 400 ff. gives a similar 
effect arising in a vintage growth model with fixed proportions through technical 
progress. See also Solow/Tobin/v. Weiz&ickerNaari. The "repairman problem" as 
analysed in Arrow/Levhari/Sheshinsky h i s  from miao substitution to macroea,nomic 
fixed proportions. Hence we might sometimes find a kind of "sharpening effect", too. 
As Houthakker has shown, the maximum aggregate output Y = 
obtainable from aggregate factor inputs K = I k and N = I n is given by 
a Cobb-Douglas production function 
Y = CKY N:  :=(a + l)/(a + /3 + 3), 6 := (8 + l)/(a + f l+  3). (5.45) 
Hence microeconomic fixed proportions might lead to macroeconomic 
variable proportions, and this idea is quite independent of the specific 
example chosen. 
3. Smoothing Demand Functions. Consider a market for a certain 
commodity. Denote by y the income of household i, denote by p the 
price of the commodity, and by xi the quantity demanded by household 
i which can either be zero or one. Individual demand is given by 
i.e. individual demand is discontinuous. The household buys either one 
unit of nothing. Assume income dist~bution to be given by a decreas- 
ing function F(y) which denotes the number of households having a 
income above y. Hence market demand x = E x i  is given by 
which can be taken to be approximately continuous and smoothly 
decreasing (Fig. 3) 2'. 
x 1 x,+x2+x3 C XI 
one household three households many households 
Fig. 3 
21 Sondemam analyses this aspect of the smoothing effect much more generally. See 
also Duesenbmy pp. 105 ff. 
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4. Convexification. A similar smoothing effect occurs when production 
sets or preferences are not convex. This leads, for the individual 
demander or supplier, to discontinuous demand and supply functions. 
These discontinuities smooth out in the aggregate, however, if many 
similar agents are present. If for a given price p the supplies x and x' 
are equally profitable for the individual firms, for instance, aggregate 
supply can be any number n x  + ( N  - n) x' where N denotes the total 
number of firms involved and n is the number of firms producing x. 
Since n can vary between zero and N, almost all intermediate supplies 
between N x  and Nx' can be realized in the aggregate. Hence aggregate 
supply would look approximately the same if all individuals firms had 
horizontal continuous supply functions between x and x' for price p 
emerging from convex production sets*. Similar arguments can be 
used for consumer demand =. 
5. Aggregate Supply in a Fixprice Model. Consider an economy with 
prices fixed in the short run. As a matter convenience, scale all 
commodites such that one unit has a price of one. Denote x:, the 
maximum supply of firm m which can profitably be sold at the given 
prices. If demand x i  larger than x,, the firm will supply only x,, if 
demand falls short of x i ,  the firm will satisfy this demand. Hence the 
supply of an individual firm can be depicted by a 45-degree diagram 
with a capacity constraint at x i  (Fig. 4). 
Now consider aggregate demand D. Along with Keynes we assume 
that "a given volume of effectik demand has a particular distribution 
of this demand between different products uniquely associated with 
it"24. Hence we can write 
and we can look at aggregate supply if D varies 
x = min { x f  (D) ,  xk)  
m 
22 See Farell. This convexification argument is only applicable, of course, if the number 
of firms is suficiently large and nonconvexities are small as compared to the size of 
the market Strictly increasing returns, e.g. would not lead to this effect 
23 Such arguments are studied extensively in general equilibrium theory (see Arrow/ 
Hahn Chap. 7). 
24 Keynes (1) p. 43 n Keynes view is somewhat different, however, since he is not 
arguing in a fixprice model. On the Keynesian supply function, see for instance 
Schlicht (3). 
If x i  (D) s xA for all m, we will have X = D, leading to the familiar 
45-degree diagram. If demand increases, however, some bottlenecks 
will occur, implying x:(D) > xk for some firms. This leads to X < D 
and the gap D -X will increase if the number of firms running into 
their capacity limits increases with increasing aggregate demand. Hence 
the aggregate supply curve will look like the heavily drawn line in 
Fig. 5 rather than like the dashed curve. This implies, of course, that 
the distinction between "classical" and "Keynesian" unemployed in fixe- 
price models, which is based on the construction of Fig. 4 is somewhat 
blurred. 
5.4.3 The Elimination Effect 
1. General Characterization. If several microeconomic relations combine 
in a macroeconomic law, some microeconomic determinants might 
cease to be of influence on the macro level. Consider the following 
example: 
2. The Demand Functions of Duesenberry Householdr. Consider a 
household with a utility function 
. 
u = u (xl/al, x2/a2, . . . , x,/a,,,) (5.50) 
where xi denotes the quantity of commodity i consumed and ai is the 
aspiration level with regard to;commodity i. This household, which is 
called a Duesenberry household, receives utility from its consumption 
relative to its aspiration levels (see Duesenberry, p. 35). 
Given income y  and prices pi, the household maximizes (5.50) under the 
budged constraint 
Z p i x i = y i .  (5.51) 
This leads to the necessary conditions 
Assume that these determine a unique maximum. 
Consider now the formation of the aspiration levels ai. These are 
considered as being determined by the consumption of the various 
commodities within the. reference group of the household: ai is a 
(possibly weighted) mean of the consumption of commodity i by the 
other households. Hence in equilibrium we can take ai= xi for the 
typical household 25. This transforms (5.52) into 
Together with (5.5 1) this implies 
with 
constant. 
Hence the aggregate demand system of the group of Duesenbeny 
households forming a reference group is characterized by constant 
budget shares and can be rationalized by introducing a representative 
household with the utility function 
which leads to the demand system (5.54) directly. Here aggregation leads 
to a simplification of the utility function through an elimination of the 
aspiration levels, and demand can be viewed as being generated by a 
representative household with a utility function (5.55) which is indepen- 
dent of aspiration levels. 
5.4.4 The System Effect 
1. General Characterization. Consider two microeconomic units which 
we want to describe by means of one aggregate relation. The behaviour 
of each unit is described by a function 
where di denotes the data exogenous for the microeconomic agent, Ui 
denotes its response to these data. We are interested in a certain 
25 On the notions of typical and representative agents see Sects. 1.2.5 and 1.2.6. 
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aggregation of individual actions 
which could, of course, be described formally as determined by the 
data dl and dz: 
It could be, however, that the data for individual 2 are partially deter- 
mined by the actions of individual 1, and vice versa: 
If these mutual interdependencies are sufficiently strong, the relation 
(5.58) would violate the causal isolation principle, since the interdepen- 
dency between variables and data cannot be neglected. 
In order to take this into account, write these dependencies 
explicitly 
dz=d2(~1 ,  D) (5.f50) 
where D denotes the data exogeneous for the system (5.58). Solving 
(5.58), (5.59), (5.60) yields 
which might describe a relationship between the variables V and D 
which appears quite different from either the relation between u l  and D 
obtained from U I  =fi (dl (02, D)) or the relation between v2  and D 
obtained from u 2  =fi (dZ (U D)). The example of the Duesenberry 
households in Sect. 5.4.3 can be viewed as an illustration for the systems 
effect which leads, in that case, to an elimination of certain microeco- 
nomically important variables. The following example illustrates the 
systems effect from another angle and exemplifies the nature of the 
dynamic aggregation problems alluded to in Sect. 5.3. 
2. The Long-Run Savings Function in a Model of Di~tribution~~. 
Consider a neoclassical growth model: Labor productivity y is deter- 
mined by the capital-labor ratio k according to the production function 
The wage rate w and the profit rate r are determined by the marginal 
productivities of labor ,and capital, respectively: There are n groups of 
individuals (or households), indexed by i = 1,2, . . . , n, which are char- 
acterized by their savings ratio si (0 < si < 1). 
Denote by Ni the number of individuals belonging to group i and by 
ki the capital holdings of group i. If all individuals receive the wage w, 
income of group i is 27 
Savings lead to capital accumulation according to 
K~ = si . Yi (5.64) 
Assume that all groups grow with the common growth rate g 
N , = ~ N ~ ,  i =  1,2 ,..., n. 
Hence the relative group sizes 
ai=Ni/CNi, i = l , 2  ,..., n 
remain constant through time. 
Define per capita wealth of group' i as 
ki:=Ki/Ni, i =  1,2, ..., n (5.67) 
and the capital-labor ratio as 
26 The following is a variant of Stiglitz' distribution model. 
27 Equation (5.63) presupposes only that the average wage and the average rate of profit 
is the same for all groups. 
28 If Ni is measured in eficiency units, g is the sum of population growth and Harrod- 
neutral technical progress. 
This implies together with (5.66) and (5.67) that the capital-labor ratio 
is the average of per capita wealth holdings 
Furthermore (5.63) - (5.67) yield 
Together with (5.69) and (5.62), this defines the evolution of per capita 
wealth holdings, the capital-labor ratio, wages, and the rate of profit 
over time. 
Our aggregation problem is the following: We take capital intensity 
k as our macro variable, i.e. we use the aggregation rule 
and aim for a Solow-type differential equation 
such that the movement of k,  as described by (5.62), (5.69), and (5.70) 
is approximated by the movement of x as described by (5.62) and (5.72) 
while neglecting the structure;of wealth distribution. How should we 
choose the aggregate savings ratio s(-), and what are the arguments we 
should insert into the brackets if we want to use aggregative variables 
only? 
But before we consider this aggregation problem, we shall analyse 
the true model (5.70). 
Consider Eq. (5.70). For any particular k and associated factor prices 
w = w (k )  and r = r (k ) ,  we can define equilibrium per capita wealth 
holdings of group i as 
k f  = k f  ( k )  := si w ( k )  , i = l , 2  ,..., n 
9 - si r ( k )  
If group i has ki = k f  , ki will remain stationary. 
The equilibrium of system (70) can be defined, hence, by the 
conditions 
Proposition. There exists a unique solution ( k l  , . . . , kn) z 0  of (5.74). It 
is a (locally) stable equilibrium of system (5.70). 
Proof: Existence. Consider the function of k  
The requirement k f  z 0 for all i, restricts the range of k  to the set 
For k  E IK, k* is continuously differentiable. Since k  1 k implies 
k* -, co and k  -* co implies (k*/k)  -+ 0, continuity implies existence. 
Uniqueness. From (5.72) and (5.62) we find 
d k f  f" 
-=- 
dk k f  ( k f  - k )  W 
and hence 
dk* f" 
-- -- 
dk c a i k : ( k :  - k ) .  W 
Evaluating this equation at equilibrium, and taking f" < 0  into account 
leads to 
dk* f' 
- = - C a i ( k i - k ) ' < O  at k i = k f  forall i ( 5 . 7 9 )  dk w 
which implies uniqueness. 
Stability. Denote equilibrium by (El, g2, . . . , E n )  and write E =  Z a, Ei, 
* = w (g).  Consider the Ljapunov function 
Its time derivative is 
Ei si w 
v = z ( ~ ~ - & . ) ~ . -  ( k t  - ki)  
si w k f  
with w = w (k ) ,  k:  = k f  (k) .  
The Taylor expansion around equilibrium yields the approximation 
This can be written in matrix notation. Define 
- f " (E) -  - - 
zj := ki - ki, bi := k, (k, - k) B 
and introduce the column vectors z, b, and a with components zi, bi, 
and a,, respectively. Hence (5.82) is equivalent to 
The matrix ba' has roots p, = pz = pn-, = 0 and 
(see Zurmiihl p. 164). The matrix A has the roots Ai = pi - 1. Hence the 
range of A is pn- 1 S z'Az/zf z S - 1 for z + 0. This shows that V is 
decreasing around equilibrium, and this proves stability, Q.E.D. 
Now consider the aggregation problem. As noted in Sect. 5.3.2 the 
aggregation procedure is not unique. Hence it might be appropriate 
to use our example for illustrating the nature of this nonuniqueness by 
discussing alternative aggregati~n procedures. 
One way to determine the aggregate savings ratio in the macro 
equation 
ic=sf(x)-gx (5.85) 
is to insert the aggregate savings ratio emerging in the true model in 
equilibrium. Denote it by 5: 
This is a constant determined by the data of the model. We have, in 
particular 
In other words, the aggregate savings ratio increases if individual 
savings ratios or the growth rate increase. Furthermore, 9 is dependent 
upon the shape of the production function. An additive shift /3 in the 
production function will yield, for instance, 
This equation illustrates some of the features of aggregative models 
noted in the text: The aggregate savings ratio is determined not only by 
the individual savings ratios, but by parameters such as the growth rate 
which are irrelevant microeconomically, and by the shape of the pro- 
duction function, which renders the macroeconomic savings ratio 
context dependent. 
Now let us look for alternative aggregation procedures. Instead of 
using a constant macroeconomic savings ratio, we might consider it to 
be a function of our macro variable x: 
As long as the resulting differential equation 
has the unique positive stable equilibrium i i=  k; this is a possible 
alternative. This implies, however, that s(Z) = 3. Hence the macroeco- 
nomic savings function will depend, directly or indirectly, on the 
growth rate and the shape of the production function, i.e. a qualitative 
difference between the micro and macro functions and context depen- 
dency cannot be avoided. 
Furthermore, how should we select the function s(x).? "~pt imal"  
aggregation would require choosing s(x) such that the aggregation set 
covers the true solutions for most of the time (see the discussion in 
Sect. 5.2.2). Without going into mathematical details it might be 
sufficient here to point out that such a choice might lead to a canonical 
aggregation procedure (locally at least): Select that trajectory of the true 
system (kl (t), . . . , k, (t)) which approaches equilibrium with the slowest 
speed, and look at the associated development of k(t). If k(t) is strictly 
monotone, take the savings ratio s(k) :=(k + gk) f (k); if not, take 
s (x) = 3. This makes the aggregation set equal to slowest trajectory, and 
locally it' implies that s(x) is determined by equating the smallest 
characteristic root 
aggregate system: 
A of the true system with the characteristic root of the 
Hence around equilibrium the "optimal" macro savings rate is given by 
s(x) =S+s'(ii)(x- 2) =S+(A+g-Sf')(%- ii) 
if the approach is monotone (Schlicht (6).) 
Still another way to obtain an aggregate savings rate as a function of 
capital intensity is to aim not a comprehensive aggregation set, but 
rather at reduction of context dependency. We might aim, for instance, 
to write the savings function in such a way that the aggregate savings 
ratio depends on wages and profits, as determined by the production 
function - but so that the functional form of the savings ratio is 
independent of the production function. This can be done by treating 
system (5.70) in a way which resembles the moving equilibrium method 
very closely: Take the wage rate w and the profit rate r as fixed and 
look at the "temporary equilibrium" wealth holdings k: resulting 
therefrom - as in (5.73) - 
For given factor prices, we obtain therefore an equilibrium capital 
intensity k* := C a i  k: and an associated savings rate 
L ai si(w + r k:) L ai si/(g - si r) 
s* (r) := - 
... I -1.. Lai/@ - si r) 
As long as the individual stability conditions g > sir are satisfied, (i.e. 
if k E K) this function is increasing in the rate of interest: 
Hence if we insert, in a second step, r = r(k) according to (5.62), we 
obtain s(x) = s* (r(x)), which can be inserted into the macro equation 
(5.91), and we again obtain the unique stable equilibrium ii = &. 
The savings ratio s* is, however, independent of the shape of the 
production function: all influences entering from the production side 
are captured by the rate of interest. In this sense, context dependency is 
reduced by using s*. But again we have a qualitative difference 
between micro and macro equations: The individual savings ratios are 
independent of the rate of interest whereas the latter influences, 
through its impact upon distribution and through the systems effect the 
aggregate savings ratio. Furthermore the aggregate savings ratio s* 
depends upon the growth rate of the system (it is increasing with g), 
whereas the individual saving ratios are independent of that growth 
rate. 
This example might illustrate, therefore, that there is no "correct" 
aggregation procedure, even for a given and well-defined problem: A 
model which minimizes context dependency will not necessarily offer a 
good dynamic approximation of the tnte movement (i.e. a comprehen- 
sive aggregation set), and vice versa. Our purpose will be decisive 
regarding the aggregation procedure actually chosen. 
5.5 Hermeneutic Aggregation 
* 
5.5.1 The Status of the Aggregation Problem 
The aggregation problem can be considered from two different perspec- 
tives: On the one hand we can ask how a given macroeconomic system 
can be described consistently in lower dimensions by a macroeconomic 
system. This is the technical aggregation problem. 
On the other hand, however, we might ask quite generally how the 
nexus between microeconomic and macroeconomic models is to be 
conceived. This is the hermenwtic aggregation problem. It pertains in 
particular to those macroeconomic theories lacking an explicit micro- 
economic foundation, and this is practically the whole body of macro- 
economics as pertaining to business cycles, foreign trade, distribution, 
money and employment (Even if "microeconomic foundations" have 
been developed in some instances here, their elliptical or metaphorical 
character virtually excludes strict applications.) In these cases we might 
look for some justification for starting with macroeconomic models 
directly. What are the implicit premises of such a procedure, and what 
might be the meaning of those macroeconomic relations which have 
not been derived from explicit microeconomic foundations? This 
amounts to considering the aggregation problem from a hermeneutic 
perspective. 
The technical aggregation problem poses merely technical rather 
than fundamental problems, since a microeconomic theory is to be 
presupposed here. We can use the microeconomic theory if we are 
unable to produce an aggregative version. 
The hermeneutic aggregation problem is, in contrast, of a more 
fundamental character, since it pertains to all economic theories, in 
principle: all economic theories can be viewed as macro in the sense 
that any relationship we start with can be viewed as being generated by 
some underlying processes, and this generation gives rise to the herme- 
neutic aggregation problem - we cannot dispose of it a priori. 
5.5.2 Revised Reductionism 
Although the fundamental nature of the hermeneutic aggregation 
problem might be conceded in principle, one could still adopt a 
reductionist position by maintaining that micro laws are more funda- 
mental than macro laws since the former "cause" the latter. Hence laws 
pertaining to lower levels of aggregation have a higher scientific status 
than laws relating to macro surface phenomena. In the words of 
Menger, "economic phenomenaiare results of the uncountable number 
of individual economic endeavours . . . . Hence we have to interpret 
them theoretically as such" (Menger, p. 87, my translation). 
This revised reductionism, as we might call it, tends to deny the 
usefulness of aggregate theories as long as they have not been derived 
by technical aggregation, since, as Menger puts it, these theoriestcan 
only be fictitious, and this renders the hermeneutic aggregation prob- 
lem irrelevant. 
5.5.3 Macroeconomic Order and Microeconomic Chaos 
The premises of revised reductionism sketched above, namely, that 
laws are more fundamental the lower the level of aggregation to which 
they pertain, and that micro laws "cause" macro laws (and not vice 
versa) seems to be unfounded. 
In order to explain this, consider the SAP problem discussed in 
Sect. 5.2.4: We have a set of microewnomic systems Fm; an aggrega- 
tion rule a: IRm + Rn; a set of macroeconomic systems Fn; and an 
aggregation procedure P: F m  -r 7" which associates a macroeconomic 
model F E F n  to any given microeconomic model f E Fm. 
Obviously microeconomic and macroeconomic models coexist. 
Neither the aggregation rule nor the aggregation procedure are con- 
ceived as having a causal claim29. They simply link two vistas of the 
same process, referring to two levels of aggregation selected from a 
spectrum of conceivable descriptions. 
F'urthermore, macro theories are more general than micro theories 
in the following sense: Typically the aggregation procedure will not be 
bijective, since different micro models might lead to the same macro 
model. Assume that all micro models out of a certain class C lead to 
the same macro model 
This macro model is more general than any micro model since it refers 
to the whole class C of micro models. It is, in the sense of Hayek, a 
pattern which is common to the whole class of micro models C. If there 
is a true micro model f which is stable, i.e. which remains unchanging 
over time, the associated macro model is stable. If the micro model 
changes within C, however, this microeconomic instability does not 
carry over to the macro model. Hence the macro model is not only 
more general, but more stable than the underlying micro model. 
Greater overall stability is, however, important in economics since it is 
often quite unreasonable to postulate stability throughout an economic 
system. We are bound to argue in a framework of ceteris paribus 
clauses, using the isolating approach, and are trying to understand 
economic regularities without spelling out the underlying psychological 
and physical laws in detail. Hence if we are interested in stable traits of 
economic processes, we have to select an appropriate level of aggrega- 
tion, and there is no a priori presumption that lower levels of aggrega- 
tion will exhibit more stability. 
The mathematical chaos theory illuminates a related point. Con- 
sider a differential equation x = f ( x )  and consider its solutions x(t ,  xo) 
for alternative initial values. These solutions. might turn out to be 
sensitive to inital values: The trajectories x (t,  xo) and x (t, xo + E )  
29 I hope this statement is clear in spite of the unsolved ambiguity of the notion of 
'causality: Philosophically speaking we do not know what "causality" means. See the 
review by Stegmiiller, Chaps. V and VII. 
diverge for arbitrarily small disturbances e in the initial values. Such 
movements are termed chaotic: 
Small changes in initial conditions lead to large and unpredictable changes in the 
long-run evolution of the system.. . . This means that computations of long-run behaviour 
will be seriously affected by small errors. Furthermore, when a trajectory winds close to its 
initial point in phase space, sensitivity to initial conditions implies that its future 
evolution will, in general, be completely different from its past; in that sense, no long-range 
pattern can be discerned. An experimentalist who tries to describe the detailed behaviour 
of such a system will look in vain for reproducible trajectories, for unavoidable errors as 
well as noise during the experiment will conspire to produce a different pattern during 
each run. Both experimentally and computationally such a system would be described as 
chaotic or irregular? 
Hence even if it is possibe to identify such a chaotic system exactly, 
which seems to be almost impossible, we could not use it for 
predictions since computational rounding errors are unavoidable. 
Chaotic systems might be ergodic, however, in the sense that there 
exists a nontrivial function g of x such that the time average 
1 - 
lim - g (x  (I, x0)) dt 
T-rco T 0 
is a well-defined vector of constants independent of initial conditions 
for almost all initial values. n i s  ergodicity seems to be typical for 
dynamical systems, chaotic systdms included 3'. Hence the chaotic micro 
system x = f ( x )  might give rise to a certain regularity in the macro 
variables defined as time averages of g(x):  Micro chaos and macro 
order might coexist. 
Hence it might occur that stable structures occur only on a macro 
level: The underlying micro system might be unstable over time, or it 
might be chaotic. In these cases it seems to be futile to insist upon 
reductionism: We will not be able to detect the micro system; and we 
will not be interested in those chaotic movements as long as our aim is 
to describe regularities, and these occur on the macro level only. Hayek 
puts it as follows: "The fact is that in studies of complex phenomena 
30 Yorke and Yorke p. 78. The b a t  known and simplest example for a dynamic system 
leading to chaotic movements is the difference equation x,,, = ax,(l -x,) with 
3.57 < a < 4. See YorkeNorke, Sect 4.4 for a discussion of this equation. By the way, 
Day has recently introduced chaos theory into economics. 
31 See Yorkc and Yorke, p. 91. In a more restricted sense we might talk about ergodicity 
i f  the time average of x is independent of initial values, i.e. by choosing g(x )  = x. The 
difference equation given in the preceding footnote displays ergodicity in this sense. 
general patterns are all that is characteristic of those persistent wholes 
which are the main object of our interest, because a number of 
enduring structures will have this general pattern in common and 
nothing else" (Hayek ( I ) ,  p. 345). 
This does not imply, however, that microeconomic theories are to 
be discarded: They have their definite advantages, too. In particular 
they offer more detail and meaning in many cases. There seems to be 
no general a priori presupposition, therefore, that one approach is 
superior to the other. This will depend on the problem we are dealing 
with, and the questions we wish to answer. 
Another aspect of the debate on reductionism is to be stressed: Very 
often it will be impossible to identify a micro system because of lack of 
data. This renders micro assumptions largely arbitrary, and macro 
assumptions covering a broader class of micro behaviour seem both 
more plausible - since they are less restrictive - and more easily 
testable. To take an example: It is well known from the work of 
Sonnenschein and Debreu that the general equilibrium model implies 
basically no restrictions on the system of excess demand functions other 
than the budget constraint. Hence no dynamic or comparative static 
results can be obtained without idroducing additional restrictions. 
Restrictions on individual behaviour are, however, much more con- 
fining and more difficult to defend than aggregate assumptions sum- 
marizing the collective results of individual actions. If we want to make 
sure that those aggregate assumptions involve no contradictions, it 
suffices to present one single example, which can very often be 
provided by the assumption that all individuals are alike. This seems to 
be the main justification for using the concept of a typical agent 32. 
Putting all these arguments together we conclude that macroeco- 
nomic relations are more general and more stable than the underlying 
micro relations, and are more accessible to the introduction of addi- 
tional testable assumptions. 
5.5.4 Structural Causality 
The idea that invariant patterns emerge on .the surface of a social 
system which appears rather irregular on the micro level has gained 
32 A particularly important example of this type of argument is provided by Hiidenbrand's 
"law of demand". On the concepts of typical and representative agents, see Sects. 1.25 
and 1.2.6. 
considerable impact in the social sciences. Sometimes it has been 
radicalized by maintining that micro relations are "determined" by 
macro relations. We shall henceforth speak of "structural causality" 
when referring to this holistic view ". Let us give some illustration. 
1 .  Selection by Competition. Darwin's theory of natural selection ex- 
plains the shape and behaviour of organisms by the principle of survival 
of the fittest. In analogy to that principle competition can be viewed as 
enforcing certain modes of behaviour by eliminating others (see 
Alchian). This argument gives the main reason for presupposing profit 
maximization, or growth maximization, or other competitively viable 
strategies on the side of the firms without recourse to psychology. In 
this sense, the competitive system enforces certain behavioural modes 
upon the agents through structural causation. Quite obviously competi- 
tion itself is the outcome of individual behaviour, however, in the same 
sense as the Darwinian environments leading to natural selection can be 
viewed as being generated by the behaviour of organisms. It might 
nevertheless be fruitful to adopt the view of structural causation here if 
the outcome of competition is independent of individual behaviour for 
a wide spectrum of individual behavioural strategies, or if we can 
assume that the selective environment is sufficiently invariant with 
regard to the process under study that we are entitled to fix it under a 
ceteris paribus clause satisfying the isolation principle. 
2. Structural Causation in Mhrx. In Man,  the idea of structural 
causation assumes a central position. He considers "capital" rather than 
"the capitalists" as one of the principal actors in the economic process. 
The capitalists are conceived as "character masks" which are forced by 
competition to act "in the interest of capital". He writes: "By and large, 
this is independent of benevolence or malice of the individual capitalist. 
Free competition enforces the immanent laws of capitalist production 
upon the individual capitalist from the outside" (Marx p. 268). His 
analysis attempts to explain the "universal laws of capitalistic accumu- 
lation" which manifest themselves in different countries in different 
specific historical appearances, and he draws a sharp distinction here: 
"The general and necessary tendencies of capital are to be distinguished 
from their outward appearances" (Marx p. 335). His theory aims at 
explaining those general laws which are thought to determine specific 
historical events. Only events and specific historical developments 
33 Notwithstanding the philosophical problems associated with the notion of causality, 
see footnote p. 95 above. 
serving those necessary tendencies will turn out to be relevant and 
override other possible influences". Hence the macro patterns are 
thought of as determining, through structural causation, individual 
events. 
3. Structuralism. The structuralist intent is quite similar: The aim is to 
explain a certain "structure" within which "events" realize. These 
events are thought of as being determined - although not uniquely 
determined - by the "structure". 
In linguistics the structure-event juxtaposition appears as that of 
"langue" and "parole" (de Saussure pp. 9-25): language as a system 
of rules, determining possible sentences. In this sense the structure 
(langue) is prior to the event (parole) and can be analysed separately. 
In an analoguous way, Ltvi-Strauss has analysed marriage and 
kinship systems3': These systems are considered as sets of rules which 
determine possible marriages in the same way as the rules of grammar 
determine possible meaninful utterances. Various other ethnological 
problems - most notably the analysis of myths - have been tackled by 
following the paradigm of structural li,nguistics 36. 
4. Functionalism. The idea of structural causation is of central impor- 
tance here: Social facts are viewed as being determined by their 
function. They are not uniquely determined, however, since functional- 
ly equivalent solutions serve the same purpose. 
Structural Causation: Dangers of the View. The idea of structural 
causation has proved quite fruitful in the social sciences, as the 
foregoing remarks might have suggested. A "structure" is thought to 
emerge from a certain system and can be analysed in isolation. 
Furthermore this structure is thought to be invariant with regard to a 
broad class of changes in the underlying system, and this asymmetry 
leads to a causal interpretation: The structure determines the events 
rather than vice versa. 
34 Althusser calls this "surd&emination" and considers this idea as "Marx' great theoret- 
ical revolution" (see Althusser pp. 161 - 177). 
35 Ltvi-Strauss (I). For a good survey of Ltvi-Strauss' views, see Oppitz 
36 Language is considered the social fact par excellence in Structuralism. Contrary to 
Marx, structures .are hence viewed as not being replaceable by consent of free 
individuals (Marx p. 92). This is obvious with regard to language since there cannot be 
consent without communication, and the rules governing communication have to be 
presupposed in advance Hence the basic social structures are viewed as working 
unconsciously in principle and can only be discovered in retrospect (see Oppitz 
pp. 62 ff.). 
I 
The danger of this view is to forget about the fact that a macro 
system can only exist if a corresponding micro system exists. Hence a 
macro system might be independent of the precise nature of the under- 
lying micro system, but only to a certain extent, not absolutely, and the 
notion of structural causality is to be viewed always with caution: 
taking into account that it results from an isolating approach which is 
subject to critical ceteris paribus conditions. 
Proponents of structuralist views sometimes do not pay sufficient 
attention to these limitations. If Marx writes in the above-mentioned 
passage: "Free competition enforces the immanent laws of capitalist 
production upon the individual capitalist from the outside" this could 
suggest that the "immanent laws of capitalist production" exist in- 
dependently of "free competition". This reading of Marx seems to be 
patently incomprehensible, however, and many criticisms of Marxism 
oppose similar "historical laws" which determine the facts, rather than 
being determined by them. 
The reproach of idealism is put forward against structuralism and 
functionalism in the same vein: "Structures" or "functional require- 
ments" are presupposed as determining events, without taking into 
consideration that these structures or functional requirements emerge 
from those very events which they are supposed to determine3'. This 
criticism seems to be correct as far as it goes, but if it is interpreted as 
implying that the notion of structural causation is misleading in 
principle, this seems to neglect a'possible stability of macro structures 
with regard to micro changes. This asymmetry provides the basic 
justification for using the notion of structural causation fruitfully, and 
no a priori argument can exclude this possibility 38. 
37 For a defense of idealistic structuralism, however, see Ltvi-Strauss (2) pp. 19 ff. 
38 A related problem of some importance, which can be touched only in passing here, is 
involved in the Marxian notion of "ultimate determination" ("Derermination in lerzter 
Imtanz"), see Balibar pp. 212-222. How can we interpret the view that a complex 
interdependent system - a society for instance - is "ultimately determined" by some 
of its parts, such as the system of production? One answer is provided through the 
present approach. This can be illustrated best by reference to the Marshallian market 
model discussed in Sect. 3.3.1. Here the fast variable (the price) is determined by the 
slow variable, and the slow variable ultimately determines, in consequence, its own 
development 
5.6 Adequate Aggregation 
Returning to the idea that micro chaos might lead to stable macro 
structures, it can be argued that the chaotic micro system describes the 
aggregate behaviour of an underlying well-structured micro system, and 
so forthJ9. Hence we can imagine various possible levels of aggregation 
exhibiting stable and comparatively simple structures, and in between 
these levels complexity. It appears sensible, then, to take those levels of 
aggregation distinguished by stability and simplicity as our starting 
point for further analysis. 
But, of course, the questions we pose require certain levels of 
aggregation by themselves: Microeconomic questions require microeco- 
nomic theories although macro considerations might contribute to solve 
them. On the other hand, macroeconomic questions cannot typically be 
analyzed fruitfully in microeconomic terms (see Sect. 5.5.3). Insisting a 
priori on a particular level of aggregation does not therefore seem very 
sound. We have to select our theory with respect to our aim. 
Hence we have to select a level of aggregation on which we have 
reasons to believe we can tackle our problem and such that the relations 
on which our analysis is built are sufficiently stable with regard to the 
processes we want to study: Conclusions are to be obtained and the 
isolation principle satisfied. But there is no a priori rule that one 
particular level of aggregation is to be preferred irrespective of the 
problem under discussion. We are bound to select an aggregation level 
which is appropriate to the problem under consideration. 
39 Note that the chaotic systems discussed in S e n  5.5.3 can be so viewed. 
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6. Epilogue. Economic Imagination 
The economic needs the three great 
intellectual faculties, perception, imagination, 
and reasoe. and most of all he needs 
imagination, to put him on the track 
of those events which are remote or lie 
below the surface, and of those effects 
of visible causes which are remote or 
lie below the surface. 
Alfred Marshall 
Leaning back again, we might look at all that has been said from a 
broader perspective. Emphasizing that economic thinking proceeds by 
isolating the relevant processes and stressing the hermeneutic nature of 
the aggregation problem amount to envisaging economic processes as 
embedded in a broader context. Furthermore, in deciding whether these 
processes possess a sufficient degree of autonomy to make it possible to 
treat them in isolation, we must rely primarily on disciplined imagina- 
tion. 
In this sense, the task of the economist is similar to that of the poet: 
Lost in thoughts, he taps his knee with his wandlike pencil, and at the same instant a car 
(New York licence plate) passes along the road, a child bangs the screen door of a neigh- 
boring porch, an old man yawns in a misty Turkestan orchard, a granule of cindergray 
sand is rolled by the wind on Venus, a Docteur Jaques Hirsch in Grenoble puts on his 
reading glasses, and trillions of other such trifles occur - all forming an instantaneous and 
transparent organism of events, of which the poet (sitting in a lawn chair, at Ithaca, N.Y.) 
is the nucleus. (Nabokov, p. 161 .) 
The task of the economist is slightly different, however, in that he views 
the various marionettes as strung together by the price system and the 
flow of commodities but not so tightly as to exclude signalling among 
them, or whimsical reactions. Going beyond the ambition of his 
physiocratic ancestors, he is not only interested in exhibiting this 
picture, but is looking for its inner mechanics: those causal chains 
below the surface which set the picture in motion. This undertaking 
requires isolating specific phenomena and considering the interaction 
of aggregates without forgetting about the whole; it requires reason and 
imagination. 
Furthermore, since the economist happens to be a naturalist, he will 
be utterly dissatisfied with merely inventing his figures - he aims at 
devising them in such a way that the bustle of the real world is 
mimicked by them (or that the real world mimics his picture). This 
requires perception as well as imagination and renders his task 
somewhat more difficult than that of the poet. But, as the late Charles 
Th. Hecktik (wriggling in a rocking chair in his crammed smokey 
study) used to babble, the economist is sometimes rewarded with the 
opportunity to observe incidents which had previously been suggested 
by his picture. 
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